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ABSTRACT	  	  HALL,	  LUCAS	   	   	   Tracking	  the	  Tupamaros:	  The	  Role	  of	  Uruguay’s	  	  Movimiento	  de	  Liberación	  Nacional-­‐Tupamaros	  in	  the	  Electoral	  Success	  of	  the	  Frente	  Amplio,	  1958	  -­‐	  Present	  	  	   This	  project	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Movimiento	  de	  Liberación	  Nacional-­‐
Tupamaros	  (Movement	  of	  National	  Liberation-­‐Tupamaros,	  MLN-­‐T)	  guerrilla	  movement,	  often	  referred	  to	  simply	  as	  the	  Tupamaros,	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  electoral	  success	  of	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  (Broad	  Front,	  FA),	  Uruguay’s	  largest	  non-­‐traditional	  coalition	  of	  political	  parties,	  from	  1958	  to	  the	  present.	  The	  Tupamaros	  officially	  emerged	  in	  1963	  in	  response	  to	  a	  period	  of	  deepening	  political	  and	  economic	  stagnation	  during	  which	  Uruguay’s	  ostensible	  tradition	  of	  two-­‐party	  dominance	  proved	  incapable	  of	  addressing	  widespread	  socio-­‐economic	  concerns.	  Throughout	  the	  1960s	  into	  the	  1970s,	  the	  Tupamaros	  used	  guerrilla	  tactics	  to	  expose	  the	  inefficiencies	  of	  the	  government	  and	  undermine	  the	  Uruguayan	  political	  system.	  	  Despite	  the	  government’s	  steadfast	  repression	  of	  the	  Tupamaros,	  culminating	  in	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship	  from	  1973	  to	  1985,	  this	  paper	  argues	  that	  the	  movement	  was	  successful	  in	  influencing	  the	  legal	  left	  to	  organize	  into	  a	  broad	  opposition	  front—the	  Frente	  Amplio—in	  1971.	  The	  thesis	  goes	  further,	  claiming	  that,	  upon	  Uruguay’s	  return	  to	  democracy	  in	  1985,	  the	  Tupamaros	  further	  legitimized	  the	  FA	  by	  abandoning	  arms	  and	  joining	  the	  coalition	  in	  1989	  through	  the	  Movimiento	  de	  Participación	  Popular	  (Movement	  of	  Popular	  Participation,	  MPP).	  In	  addition,	  since	  the	  Tupamaros	  began	  participating	  in	  elections	  in	  1994,	  the	  MPP	  has	  become	  the	  single	  largest	  party	  within	  the	  FA,	  and,	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since	  2004,	  the	  FA	  has	  won	  each	  successive	  presidential	  election,	  most	  notably	  that	  of	  José	  “Pepe”	  Mujica,	  a	  former	  Tupamaro,	  in	  2009.	  	  This	  thesis	  draws	  on	  research	  conducted	  in	  Montevideo,	  Uruguay	  during	  March	  2015.	  The	  use	  of	  personal	  testimonies,	  such	  as	  those	  by	  Clara	  Aldrighi	  and	  María	  Esther	  Gilio,	  and	  primary	  documents,	  along	  with	  the	  many	  contributions	  of	  authors	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines,	  provides	  this	  investigation	  with	  an	  authentic	  look	  inside	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Tupamaros’	  ideology	  and	  practice	  in	  promoting	  revolutionary	  change	  in	  Uruguay.	  Overall,	  the	  MLN-­‐T's	  transition	  from	  guerrilla	  movement	  to	  political	  party	  highlights	  a	  pragmatic	  departure	  from	  the	  movement’s	  fundamental	  ideology	  insomuch	  that	  the	  Tupamaros	  seized	  a	  political	  opening	  in	  Uruguay's	  history	  of	  two-­‐party	  dominance	  and	  successfully	  adapted	  to	  the	  political	  arena.
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INTRODUCTION	  	  This	  thesis	  analyzes	  the	  transition	  of	  the	  Movimiento	  de	  Liberación	  Nacional-­‐
Tupamaros	  (Movement	  of	  National	  Liberation-­‐Tupamaros,	  MLN-­‐T),	  otherwise	  more	  simply	  know	  as	  the	  Tupamaros,	  from	  its	  foundations	  as	  a	  guerrilla	  movement	  in	  Uruguay	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  to	  the	  successful	  consolidation	  of	  many	  of	  the	  movement’s	  fundamental	  members	  into	  the	  Movimiento	  de	  Participación	  Popular	  (Movement	  of	  Popular	  Participation,	  MPP),	  within	  the	  left-­‐wing	  coalition	  of	  political	  parties—the	  Frente	  Amplio	  (Broad	  Front)—in	  1989,	  following	  Uruguay’s	  return	  to	  democracy,	  after	  which	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  successfully	  rose	  to	  prominence	  with	  the	  presidential	  election	  of	  Tabaré	  Vázquez	  in	  2004	  and	  the	  eventual	  presidential	  election	  of	  José	  Mujica,	  a	  former	  leader	  of	  the	  Tupamaros	  and	  member	  of	  the	  MPP,	  in	  2009.	  	  Any	  study	  addressing	  the	  periodic	  transition	  of	  such	  a	  movement	  must	  review	  the	  political,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  influences	  that	  generated	  these	  changes	  over	  time.	  Studies	  on	  the	  twentieth	  century	  left	  in	  Latin	  America	  abound,	  including	  those	  on	  the	  foundation	  and	  history	  of	  the	  Tupamaros.	  However,	  few	  studies	  on	  the	  transition	  of	  many	  of	  the	  movement’s	  members	  into	  the	  political	  arena	  exist,	  and	  those	  that	  do	  come	  primarily	  from	  those	  in	  Uruguay	  or	  its	  neighbors,	  Argentina,	  Brazil,	  and	  Chile.	  This	  thesis	  aims	  to	  expand	  upon	  the	  body	  of	  work	  that	  already	  exists	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Tupamaros	  in	  the	  vitality	  and	  success	  of	  the	  Frente	  Amplio.	  Nonetheless,	  first	  it	  is	  important	  to	  review	  the	  body	  of	  literature	  from	  which	  the	  Tupamaros	  framed	  their	  revolutionary	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ideology,	  as	  without	  such	  analysis,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  track	  and	  assess	  the	  movement’s	  transition	  into	  party	  politics;	  such	  a	  review	  also	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  important	  starting	  point	  from	  which	  to	  compare	  the	  implementation	  of	  an	  ideology	  into	  practice,	  thus	  permitting	  a	  critical	  exploration	  of	  the	  Tupamaros’	  transition	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  fundamental	  ideology.	  	   The	  theoretical	  foundations	  of	  guerrilla	  warfare	  are,	  perhaps,	  credited	  to	  the	  Communist	  leaders	  Mao	  Zedong	  in	  China	  and	  Ho	  Chi	  Minh	  in	  North	  Vietnam,	  who	  provided	  a	  framework	  within	  which	  many	  guerrilla	  movements	  were	  formed	  internationally.	  However,	  within	  Latin	  America,	  these	  foundations	  were	  second	  to	  the	  ideological	  works	  of	  Karl	  Marx	  and	  Frederich	  Engels,	  and,	  later,	  Vladimir	  Lenin.	  Those	  like	  Marx	  and	  Engels,	  and	  later	  Lenin,	  considered	  insurrection	  primarily	  as	  an	  idea	  that	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  European	  revolutionary	  doctrine	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  but	  little	  did	  they	  consider	  it	  a	  revolutionary	  technique.	  In	  fact,	  guerrilla	  warfare	  rarely	  preoccupied	  them;	  many	  doubted	  whether	  guerrilla	  warfare,	  effective	  under	  specific	  conditions	  in	  the	  preceding	  fifty	  years,	  had	  much	  of	  a	  future,	  at	  least	  in	  Europe.	  Nonetheless,	  Marx	  and	  Engels,	  and	  later	  Lenin,	  indoctrinated	  guerrillas	  not	  only	  in	  Latin	  America,	  but	  also	  across	  parts	  of	  Africa	  and	  Asia,	  with	  a	  political	  ideology	  that	  combined	  the	  scientific	  socialist	  concepts	  of	  Marxism	  with	  the	  anti-­‐imperialist,	  democratic	  centralist	  and	  vanguardist	  party-­‐building	  principles	  of	  Leninism	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  overarching	  dialect	  of	  the	  class	  struggle.	  	  It	  was	  actually	  the	  likes	  of	  Mao	  Zedong	  and	  Ho	  Chi	  Minh	  who	  expanded	  upon	  the	  ideas	  of	  guerrilla	  warfare	  into	  a	  revolutionary	  technique	  that	  influenced	  the	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likes	  of	  Fidel	  Castro	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  Che	  Guevara,	  whose	  writings	  on	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  served	  as	  a	  lesson	  to	  guerrilla	  groups	  that	  would	  emerge	  in	  Latin	  America	  later	  in	  the	  1960s.	  But	  perhaps	  most	  important	  to	  the	  ideology	  of	  guerrilla	  groups	  in	  Latin	  America	  was	  Régis	  Debray,	  whose	  experience	  in	  Cuba	  and	  Bolivia	  influenced	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  seminal	  Revolution	  in	  the	  Revolution	  (1967).	  Although	  he,	  like	  Castro	  and	  Guevara,	  focused	  on	  rural	  guerrilla	  warfare,	  his	  idea	  of	  
foquismo	  (focalism),	  whose	  central	  principle	  is	  that	  vaguardism	  by	  cadres	  of	  small,	  fast-­‐moving	  paramilitary	  groups	  can	  provide	  a	  foco	  (focus)	  for	  popular	  discontent	  against	  a	  sitting	  regime	  and	  thereby	  lead	  to	  a	  general	  insurrection,	  became	  the	  focal	  point	  for	  urban	  guerrillas	  like	  the	  Tupamaros.	  Along	  with	  the	  likes	  of	  Carlos	  Marighella	  (1969)	  and	  Abraham	  Guillen	  (1969),	  urban	  guerrilla	  groups	  like	  the	  Tupamaros	  were	  provided	  with	  both	  the	  ideology	  and	  technique	  with	  which	  to	  create	  such	  a	  foco	  in	  Latin	  American	  cities	  like	  Montevideo.	  Beyond	  the	  ideological	  and	  technical	  framework	  of	  guerrilla	  warfare,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  instigated	  the	  proliferation	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  left	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  These	  theorists	  include	  Hans	  Singer	  and	  Raúl	  Prebisch	  (1949),	  who	  advocated	  for	  more	  protectionist	  policies,	  in	  particular,	  import	  substitution	  industrialization,	  not	  a	  trade-­‐export	  orientation,	  as	  a	  strategy	  to	  combat	  worsening	  terms	  of	  trade	  for	  underdeveloped	  countries	  in	  the	  region.	  Paul	  A.	  Baran,	  along	  with	  Paul	  Sweezy	  and	  Andre	  Gunder	  Frank,	  developed	  the	  theory	  from	  a	  Marxian	  perspective	  in	  1957	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  his	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  
Economic	  Growth;	  Marxists	  like	  Baran	  spoke	  of	  the	  international	  division	  of	  labor—skilled	  workers	  in	  the	  center,	  unskilled	  in	  the	  periphery—that	  necessitated	  more	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radical	  change	  than	  did	  structuralists	  like	  Prebisch.	  In	  addition	  to	  dependency	  theory,	  liberation	  theology,	  which	  began	  as	  a	  movement	  within	  the	  Catholic	  Church	  between	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  emerged	  as	  a	  moral	  reaction	  to	  the	  poverty	  caused	  by	  social	  injustice	  in	  the	  region,	  whose	  exponents	  Gustavo	  Gutiérrez	  (1971),	  Leonardo	  Boff,	  Jon	  Sobrino,	  Óscar	  Romero,	  and	  Uruguayan	  Juan	  Luis	  Segundo	  interpreted	  the	  teachings	  of	  Jesus	  Christ	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  liberation	  from	  unjust	  political,	  economic,	  or	  social	  conditions.	  	  As	  explained	  by	  academics,	  most	  notably	  Greg	  Grandin,	  but	  also	  Hal	  Brands,	  Jorge	  Castañeda,	  and	  others	  alike,	  these	  theories	  emerged	  among	  changes	  in	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  dynamic	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America.	  In	  A	  
Century	  of	  Revolution:	  Insurgent	  and	  Counterinsurgent	  Violence	  during	  Latin	  
America’s	  Long	  Cold	  War	  (2010),	  Greg	  Grandin	  defines	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  Latin	  America	  as	  a	  series	  of	  insurgencies	  and	  counterinsurgencies	  propelled	  by	  “the	  clash	  between	  the	  old	  and	  the	  new,	  heightened	  by	  the	  contingency	  of	  politics	  and	  aggravated	  by	  the	  fervent	  defense	  of	  interests,	  status,	  and	  values”	  that	  occurred	  in	  two	  realms	  of	  power—national	  and	  international—and	  inflamed	  each	  other;	  the	  clash	  between	  concurrent	  forces	  produced	  violent	  actions	  and	  reactions	  at	  the	  local,	  state,	  and	  international	  level—burgeoning	  movements	  of	  national	  liberation	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  increasing	  state	  repression	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  doctrine	  at	  the	  state	  and	  international	  level—provide	  a	  sociologically	  and	  historically	  nuanced	  view	  of	  the	  ideological	  hardening	  and	  accelerated	  polarization	  that	  marked	  twentieth	  century	  Latin	  America.	  	  	  
	  	   9	  
Most	  academics	  agree,	  as	  do	  Grandin,	  Brands,	  and	  Castañeda,	  but	  also	  the	  likes	  of	  Stephen	  G.	  Rabe,	  Thomas	  C.	  Wright,	  Aviva	  Chominsky,	  and	  Michelle	  Chase,	  that	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution,	  its	  ideals	  along	  with	  it,	  incited	  an	  increase	  in	  these	  insurgencies	  and	  counterinsurgencies	  that	  rocked	  most	  of	  Latin	  America	  during	  the	  later	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  In	  his	  book,	  The	  Most	  Dangerous	  Area	  in	  the	  
World:	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  Confronts	  Communist	  Revolution	  in	  Latin	  America	  (1999),	  Stephen	  G.	  Rabe	  examines	  the,	  arguably	  most	  salient,	  response	  to	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution,	  claiming	  the	  creation	  of	  John	  F.	  Kennedy’s	  Alliance	  for	  Progress,	  a	  nearly	  $20	  billion	  pursuit	  dedicated	  to	  creating	  prosperous,	  socially	  just,	  democratic	  societies	  in	  Latin	  America	  following	  the	  U.S.’s	  failure	  to	  thwart	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution,	  exacerbated	  conditions	  in	  Latin	  America	  in	  an	  intense	  crusade	  to	  eradicate	  communism	  in	  the	  region.	  Alternatively,	  in	  his	  book,	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  
Era	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution:	  Revised	  Edition,	  Thomas	  C.	  Wrights	  examines	  the	  regional	  response	  to	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution,	  claiming	  the	  radical	  social	  and	  economic	  transformation	  of	  Cuba	  and	  Castro’s	  efforts	  to	  actively	  promote	  insurrection	  against	  established	  governments	  and	  bourgeois	  power	  throughout	  Latin	  America	  instigated	  the	  simultaneous	  violent	  responses	  on	  behalf	  of	  both	  insurgent	  groups	  that	  sought	  to	  dismantle	  the	  government	  and	  internationally-­‐backed	  military	  apparatuses	  that	  sought	  to	  thwart	  such	  efforts.	  	  These	  concomitant	  arguments	  provide	  an	  important	  perspective	  from	  which	  to	  view	  those	  forces	  that	  catalyzed	  the	  emergence	  of	  guerrilla	  movements	  like	  the	  Tupamaros	  in	  Uruguay.	  Although	  studies	  on	  the	  forces	  that	  influenced	  the	  emergence	  of	  guerrilla	  movements	  in	  Latin	  America	  abound,	  few	  exist	  that	  deal	  specifically	  with	  those	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forces	  in	  Uruguay	  or	  how	  the	  Tupamaros	  interpreted	  them	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  ideology	  with	  which	  to	  dismantle	  the	  government.	  Additionally,	  the	  majority	  of	  those	  that	  do	  were	  published	  around	  the	  same	  time	  that	  did	  formerly	  emerge	  the	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship	  in	  Uruguay	  (1973).	  Nonetheless,	  a	  small	  body	  of	  work	  does	  exist	  within	  which	  to	  analyze	  the	  conditions	  in	  Uruguay	  that	  propelled	  the	  Tupamaros	  to	  seek	  revolutionary	  change,	  including	  the	  works	  of	  Arturo	  Porzecanski	  (1973),	  Carlos	  Wilson	  (1974),	  Martin	  Weinstein	  (1975),	  Juan	  Rial	  (1986)	  and,	  more	  recently,	  Lindsey	  Blake	  Churchill	  (2010),	  Peter	  Waldmann	  (2011),	  and	  Pablo	  Brum	  (2014).	  Fortunately,	  these	  studies	  emphasize	  different	  factors—political,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  forces—that	  influenced	  the	  ideology	  and	  adaptations	  of	  the	  movement	  over	  the	  years.	  Arturo	  C.	  Porzecanski,	  an	  Uruguayan	  himself,	  identifies	  three	  components	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  Tupamaros’	  ideology	  and	  practice	  in	  his	  book	  Uruguay’s	  Tupamaros:	  The	  Urban	  Guerrilla:	  their	  view	  of	  the	  present,	  their	  view	  of	  their	  future,	  and	  their	  strategy	  or	  means	  to	  go	  from	  the	  present	  into	  the	  future.	  According	  to	  him,	  the	  political-­‐economic	  conditions	  of	  the	  present	  necessitated	  a	  stark	  ideological	  change	  in	  the	  future;	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  traditional,	  inflexible	  two-­‐party	  system	  to	  address	  growing	  stagnation	  in	  the	  country’s	  livestock	  and	  industrial	  sectors	  amid	  ever-­‐growing	  foreign	  debt,	  the	  flight	  of	  domestic	  savings,	  and	  balance	  of	  payments	  problems	  in	  general,	  influenced	  those	  like	  Raúl	  Sendic,	  an	  agricultural	  law	  student	  from	  Montevideo,	  and	  some	  colleagues	  to	  round	  up	  and	  unionize	  poverty-­‐stricken	  sugarcane	  and	  sugar	  beet	  cutters	  in	  Salto	  &	  Artigas	  to	  make	  a	  350	  mile	  march	  into	  Montevideo	  that	  ended	  in	  a	  violent	  clash	  between	  protesters	  and	  police.	  Sendic	  and	  his	  following’s	  subsequent	  loss	  of	  faith	  in	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the	  power	  of	  public	  opinion	  led,	  in	  Porzecanski’s	  opinion,	  to	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  Tupamaros,	  whose	  nationalistic	  view	  of	  the	  of	  the	  future—a	  movement	  away	  from	  political	  and	  economic	  dependence	  and	  toward	  both	  a	  national	  and	  regional	  cultural	  identity,	  influenced	  by	  the	  work	  of	  Marxists	  but	  not	  entrenched	  in	  any	  monolithic	  ideological	  bloc—would	  revolutionize	  Uruguay.	  	  Other	  studies	  on	  the	  Tupamaros,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  Churchill,	  pose	  a	  different	  hypothesis.	  In	  her	  book	  Becoming	  the	  Tupamaros:	  Solidarity	  and	  Transnational	  
Revolutionaries	  in	  Uruguay	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  she	  explores	  and	  alternative	  narrative	  of	  US-­‐Latin	  American	  relations	  by	  challenging	  long-­‐held	  assumptions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  revolutionary	  movements	  like	  the	  Tupamaros.	  She	  argues	  that	  the	  Tupamaros	  were	  a	  violent	  and	  innovative	  organization	  that	  created	  a	  homegrown	  and	  unique	  form	  of	  revolution	  that	  made	  transnational	  connections	  and	  disdained	  traditional	  constructions	  of	  femininity	  for	  female	  combatants.	  Her	  study	  highlights	  the	  unique	  role	  women	  played	  in	  the	  MLN-­‐T,	  exalting	  the	  movement	  as	  a	  uniquely	  homegrown	  experiment	  to	  enact	  revolutionary	  change.	  Although	  authors	  like	  Porzecanski	  and	  Churchill,	  contest	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Tupamaros’	  ideology,	  both	  agree	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  demise	  as	  a	  guerrilla	  movement:	  political	  repression	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  an	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  and	  then	  dictatorial	  government.	  However,	  Martin	  Weinstein,	  a	  historian	  who	  has	  devoted	  much	  of	  his	  study	  to	  Uruguay,	  makes	  a	  curious	  argument	  that	  belies	  conventional	  answers	  to	  the	  Tupamaros’	  failure	  to	  incite	  revolution;	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  Tupamaros’	  failure	  was	  in	  their	  electoral	  support	  of	  the	  Frente	  Amplio,	  a	  political	  coalition	  of	  left-­‐wing	  parties,	  in	  the	  1971	  elections,	  claiming	  such	  support	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detracted	  from	  the	  political	  ideology	  upon	  which	  the	  Tupamaros	  were	  founded	  and	  allowed	  the	  tactical	  advantages	  they	  had	  already	  achieved	  to	  wane.	  Nonetheless,	  these	  studies	  bring	  into	  question	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  the	  Tupamaros	  employed	  in	  their	  revolutionary	  practice,	  a	  central	  pillar	  to	  this	  study	  of	  their	  transition	  into	  the	  political	  arena.	  Inevitably,	  many	  studies	  on	  the	  Tupamaros	  conclude	  with	  the	  Uruguayan	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship,	  officially	  the	  period	  from	  1973	  to	  1985,	  during	  which	  the	  MLN-­‐T	  was	  outlawed.	  Although	  this	  study	  does	  not	  focus	  on	  the	  Uruguayan	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship	  itself,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  concurrent	  political	  changes	  experienced	  by	  the	  Tupamaros	  in	  the	  same	  time.	  During	  that	  time	  period,	  the	  MLT-­‐T	  was	  outlawed,	  its	  members	  pursued,	  detained,	  and	  tortured,	  while	  the	  state	  of	  Uruguay	  fell	  into	  increased	  political	  repression.	  In	  addition	  to	  Weinstein,	  Juan	  Rial	  (1986)	  and	  Peter	  Waldmann	  (2010)	  emphasize	  the	  role	  of	  military	  in	  both	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Tupamaros	  and	  their	  reemergence	  as	  an	  entirely	  new	  political	  force	  during	  the	  redemocratization	  of	  Uruguay	  in	  1986.	  In	  his	  article	  “How	  Terrorism	  Ceases:	  The	  Tupamaros	  in	  Uruguay,”	  he	  argues	  that	  a	  “socialist	  revolution,”	  according	  to	  the	  likes	  of	  even	  Raul	  Sendic	  himself,	  “could	  only	  be	  realized	  by	  force.”	  Thus,	  the	  movement’s	  failure	  to	  instigate	  such	  a	  revolution	  was	  structural;	  the	  Tupamaros	  could	  not	  overcome	  the	  might	  of	  the	  dictatorship.	  These	  arguments	  provide	  this	  study	  with	  insight	  into	  the	  Tupamaros’	  ideological	  and	  pragmatic	  transition	  into	  the	  political	  arena	  following	  the	  dictatorship,	  during	  which	  the	  role	  of	  the	  military	  in	  Uruguay	  also	  changed	  dramatically;	  the	  subsequent	  fall	  of	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the	  dictatorship	  condemned	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  as	  method	  to	  enact	  change	  in	  Uruguay.	  Thus,	  some	  brief	  analysis	  of	  the	  cultural	  impact	  of	  the	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship	  on	  the	  Tupamaros’	  transition	  into	  party	  politics	  is	  salient.	  A	  varied	  body	  of	  works	  exists	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  Uruguay’s	  peculiar	  transition	  from	  parliamentary	  democracy	  to	  authoritarian	  presidency	  to	  dictatorship	  to	  presidential	  democracy	  following	  the	  dictatorship.	  This	  body	  includes	  government	  publications,	  histories,	  and	  essays	  dedicated	  to	  understanding	  Uruguay’s	  unique	  political	  transformation.	  These	  studies	  provide	  not	  only	  an	  important	  political	  perspective,	  but	  also	  a	  cultural	  one,	  as	  the	  impacts	  of	  dictatorship	  undoubtedly	  influence	  the	  nature	  of	  politics	  in	  a	  nation.	  In	  his	  book,	  Negotiating	  Democracy:	  Politicians	  and	  
Generals	  in	  Uruguay,	  Charles	  Guy	  Gillespie	  describes	  how,	  after	  the	  military	  stepped	  down	  from	  power,	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  to	  make	  concessions	  to	  the	  military	  divided	  the	  country’s	  three	  major	  parties—the	  Blancos,	  the	  Colorados,	  and	  the	  left.	  The	  eventual	  pact	  reached	  by	  the	  latter	  two	  parties	  in	  July	  1984,	  to	  not	  prosecute	  military	  offenders	  in	  exchange	  for	  their	  retreat	  to	  the	  barracks,	  had	  an	  implicit	  impact	  on	  the	  culture	  of	  politics	  in	  Uruguay’s	  return	  to	  democracy	  in	  1985,	  allowing	  the	  left	  to	  emerge	  as	  a	  legitimate	  political	  contender.	  Similarly,	  in	  her	  book	  Human	  
Rights	  and	  Democratization	  in	  Latin	  America:	  Uruguay	  and	  Chile,	  Alexandra	  Barahona	  de	  Brito	  discusses	  how	  negotiating	  truth	  and	  justice	  in	  the	  transition	  to	  democracy	  in	  Uruguay,	  a	  long	  and	  torturous	  path	  that	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  referendum	  granting	  the	  military	  amnesty	  in	  1984,	  despite	  obvious	  challenges	  to	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the	  public,	  resulted	  in	  the	  country	  sacrificing	  legal	  punishment	  for	  human	  rights	  violations	  committed	  during	  the	  dictatorship	  for	  democratic	  peace.	  	  	  Consequently,	  the	  left,	  including	  the	  Tupamaros,	  emerged—as	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  Latin	  America,	  decidedly	  different	  than	  they	  had	  during	  the	  early	  1960s—into	  the	  political	  arena.	  Many	  have	  examined	  the	  reemergence	  of	  the	  left	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  most	  notably	  Jorge	  Castañeda.	  In	  his	  book	  Utopia	  Unarmed:	  The	  Latin	  
American	  Left	  After	  the	  Cold	  War,	  he	  contests	  that	  the	  Latin	  American	  left,	  although	  markedly	  different,	  is	  not	  dead	  but	  experiencing	  temporary	  lulls	  in	  an	  ongoing	  revolution	  that	  may	  yet	  transform	  the	  hemisphere.	  He	  argues	  this	  new	  left	  has	  evolved,	  reforming	  the	  revolution	  and	  incorporating	  intellectuals	  in	  grass	  roots	  campaigns	  that	  have	  perhaps	  abandoned	  their	  socialist	  ideals	  but	  are	  still	  based	  in	  such	  ideology.	  Although,	  as	  mentioned	  before,	  some	  consider	  these	  changes	  as	  failures,	  many	  consider	  them	  merely	  as	  pragmatic	  changes.	  Specifically,	  many	  have	  examined	  these	  changes	  in	  the	  Tupamaros,	  including	  Ruth	  Berins	  Collier	  and	  David	  Collier	  (1991),	  Stephen	  Gregory	  (2009),	  Adolfo	  Garcé	  (2009),	  and	  Pablo	  Brum	  (2014).	  Both	  Gregory	  and	  Garcé	  conclude	  that	  the	  Tupamaros	  successfully	  adapted	  to	  party	  politics	  by	  pragmatically	  adopting	  more	  moderate	  ideologies.	  In	  turn,	  they	  formed	  the	  left-­‐wing	  MPP,	  within	  the	  larger	  coalition	  of	  left-­‐wing	  political	  parties	  the	  Frente	  Amplio,	  which	  coincidentally	  moved	  from	  democratic	  socialism	  to	  social	  democracy	  and	  from	  opposition	  to	  government	  in	  2004,	  with	  the	  election	  of	  Tabaré	  Vásquez	  as	  the	  first	  candidate	  from	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  to	  win	  the	  presidency.	  Gregory,	  in	  line	  with	  Castañeda,	  emphasizes	  the	  role	  of	  the	  intellectual	  left	  in	  this	  ideological	  shift.	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Besides	  these	  authors,	  very	  few	  have	  analyzed	  more	  recent	  developments	  in	  the	  movement.	  Pablo	  Brum,	  in	  his	  recent	  book,	  The	  Robin	  hood	  Guerrillas:	  The	  Epic	  
Journey	  of	  Uruguay’s	  Tupamaros,	  histories	  the	  Tupamaros	  from	  their	  foundation	  in	  the	  1960s	  to	  the	  election	  of	  the	  country’s	  first	  Tupamaro	  president,	  José	  Mujica,	  in	  2009.	  He	  argues,	  more	  emphatically	  than	  do	  those	  aforementioned	  authors,	  that	  this	  history	  is	  inextricably	  tied	  to	  the	  Jose	  Mujica’s	  success	  as	  President	  of	  the	  Oriental	  Republic	  of	  Uruguay.	  	  Nonetheless,	  so	  few	  studies	  specifically	  examine	  this	  recent	  history	  that	  more	  investigation	  is	  necessary	  to	  properly	  place	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Tupamaros	  in	  an	  analysis	  trajectory	  of	  the	  left’s	  success	  in	  Uruguay.	  Thus,	  beyond	  the	  scholarly	  contributions	  of	  those	  political	  scientists,	  economists,	  historians,	  anthropologists,	  and	  others	  who	  have	  contributed	  to	  an	  academic	  body	  of	  work,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  analyze	  this	  political	  transition	  firsthand.	  Beyond	  archival	  research,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  interview	  those	  politicians,	  professors,	  former	  Tupamaros,	  and	  citizens	  alike,	  whose	  perspectives	  as	  Uruguayans	  illuminate	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  this	  transition.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  personal	  interviews	  collected	  not	  only	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  also	  in	  different	  locations	  in	  Uruguay,	  will	  help	  illustrate	  the	  personal	  reactions	  and	  perceptions	  of	  Uruguayans	  who	  experienced	  this	  history	  firsthand,	  and	  will	  support	  archival	  research	  with	  individual,	  oral	  histories	  that	  would	  otherwise	  be	  lost	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  following	  chapters	  examine	  the	  ever-­‐changing	  MLN-­‐T	  by	  first	  examining	  their	  foundations	  in	  Uruguay	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  the	  movement	  emerged,	  and	  then	  examines	  how	  these	  conditions	  changed	  alongside	  the	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movement	  itself,	  resulting	  in	  a	  unique	  case-­‐study	  of	  a	  former	  guerrilla	  member-­‐turned-­‐president	  within	  an	  even	  more	  dynamic	  movement.
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THE	  GROWTH	  AND	  DECAY	  OF	  THE	  TWO	  PARTY	  SYSTEM,	  1825	  –	  1958	  	  	   Uruguay	  is	  the	  second-­‐smallest	  country	  in	  South	  America	  (after	  Suriname),	  and	  is	  slightly	  smaller	  than	  the	  state	  of	  Washington.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Affairs	  estimates	  that,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2015,	  the	  population	  of	  Uruguay	  will	  be	  approximately	  3.430	  million	  people.	  According	  to	  the	  CIA	  World	  Fact	  Book,	  nearly	  90	  percent	  of	  that	  population	  is	  ethnically	  white,	  descendants	  of	  immigrants	  primarily	  from	  Spain	  and	  Italy	  who	  arrived	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  into	  the	  twentieth	  through	  the	  capital	  and	  industrial	  port	  center	  of	  Montevideo.	  Since	  then,	  the	  population	  has	  been	  divided	  between	  Montevideo	  and	  the	  surrounding	  area	  and	  the	  countryside.	  Incidentally,	  Montevideo	  is	  also	  the	  political,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  hub	  of	  the	  country,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  main	  artery	  to	  the	  outside	  world.	  Over	  90	  percent	  of	  the	  country	  is	  urbanized,	  or	  employed	  in	  areas	  other	  than	  agriculture.	  Having	  said	  that,	  Uruguay’s	  geographic	  terrain,	  constituted	  almost	  entirely	  by	  the	  rolling	  plains	  and	  low	  hills	  known	  as	  the	  pampas,	  has	  established	  it	  as	  a	  traditional	  producer	  and	  exporter	  of	  agricultural	  commodities—namely	  beef,	  soy,	  cellulose,	  rice,	  wheat,	  dairy	  products,	  and	  wool.1	  According	  to	  the	  World	  Bank,	  agricultural	  exports	  accounted	  for	  10	  percent	  of	  gross	  value	  added	  (GVA)	  to	  GDP	  in	  2014.2	  In	  addition,	  Uruguay	  boasts	  a	  well-­‐educated	  workforce	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  social	  spending.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  CIA	  World	  Fact	  Book.	  Uruguay.	  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-­‐world-­‐factbook/geos/uy.html.	  2	  World	  Bank.	  Uruguay.	  http://data.worldbank.org/country/uruguay.	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   Today,	  Uruguayan	  politics	  are	  defined	  in	  the	  1966	  constitution	  (to	  which	  there	  have	  been	  many	  amendments,	  most	  recently	  in	  2004),	  which	  established	  a	  presidential	  representative	  republic	  maintained	  by	  separate	  executive,	  legislative,	  and	  judicial	  branches	  of	  government.	  The	  executive	  branch	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  chief	  of	  state,	  who	  is	  also	  the	  head	  of	  government,	  and	  his	  cabinet	  of	  appointed	  ministers	  approved	  by	  the	  parliament.	  Both	  the	  president	  and	  vice	  president	  are	  elected	  by	  popular	  vote	  for	  one,	  non-­‐consecutive	  five-­‐year	  term.	  The	  legislative	  branch	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  bicameral	  General	  Assembly,	  which	  consists	  of	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Senators	  and	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Representatives,	  each	  of	  which	  are	  elected	  by	  proportional	  representation	  for	  five-­‐year	  terms.	  The	  judiciary	  branch	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Justices,	  which	  consists	  of	  five	  judges,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  nominated	  by	  the	  president	  and	  appointed	  in	  joint	  conference	  with	  the	  General	  Assembly.	  Judges	  are	  appointed	  for	  ten-­‐year	  terms,	  with	  re-­‐election	  after	  a	  lapse	  of	  five	  years	  following	  the	  previous	  term.	  	  Although	  this	  demography	  bears	  some	  similarity	  among	  its	  neighbors	  Argentina	  to	  the	  west,	  the	  Brazilian	  state	  of	  Rio	  Grande	  do	  Sul	  to	  the	  north,	  and	  Chile	  on	  the	  Pacific	  coast	  of	  the	  Southern	  Cone,	  Uruguay	  is	  distinct	  within	  Latin	  America	  for,	  among	  other	  things,	  a	  thriving	  democratic	  history.	  By	  the	  time	  Uruguay	  officially	  declared	  democracy	  in	  the	  1918	  constitution,	  its	  political	  elites	  had	  already	  competed	  for	  four	  decades	  using	  parliamentary	  practices.	  According	  to	  Charles	  Guy	  Gillespie,	  a	  foremost	  historian	  on	  Uruguay,	  “Unlike	  Chile,	  Uruguay’s	  progress	  toward	  mass	  democracy	  was	  early,	  and	  unlike	  Argentina	  it	  was	  built	  on	  a	  competitive	  parliamentary	  tradition	  rather	  than	  representing	  a	  discontinuous	  leap.	  Nor	  did	  it	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lead	  to	  the	  electoral	  annihilation	  of	  the	  conservative	  opposition,	  as	  occurred	  in	  Argentina	  about	  the	  same	  time.”3	  In	  fact,	  despite	  the	  militarist	  dictatorship	  of	  Lorenzo	  Latorre	  from	  1876	  to	  1880	  and	  the	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship	  from	  1973	  to	  1985,	  the	  military	  has	  been	  a	  relatively	  tame	  institution	  in	  Uruguay.	  	  This	  tradition	  has	  contributed	  to	  Uruguay’s	  reputation	  as	  the	  most	  democratic	  nation	  in	  Latin	  America.	  According	  to	  the	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit’s	  Democracy	  Index,	  Uruguay	  currently	  ranks	  more	  democratic	  than	  Costa	  Rica,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  United	  States.4	  Even	  so,	  politics	  were,	  for	  nearly	  170	  years,	  apportioned	  between	  two	  parties—the	  Colorados	  (Red	  Party)	  and	  the	  Blancos	  (National,	  or	  White	  Party).	  Between	  1865	  and	  1958	  alone,	  the	  Colorados	  dominated	  the	  presidency.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  2004	  national	  elections	  that	  a	  candidate	  from	  a	  non-­‐traditional	  party	  was	  elected	  president	  since	  the	  official	  establishment	  of	  the	  Republic	  in	  1828.	  On	  31	  October	  2004,	  Tabaré	  Ramón	  Vázquez	  Rosas	  was	  elected	  from	  the	  Partido	  
Socialista	  (Socialist	  Party)	  within	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  (Broad	  Front)	  coalition	  of	  political	  parties,	  effectively	  ending	  two-­‐party	  dominance	  in	  Uruguay.	  Since	  then,	  the	  Frente	  has	  dominated	  presidential	  politics,	  with	  the	  election	  of	  former	  Tupamaro	  José	  Alberto	  “Pepe”	  Mujica	  in	  2009	  and	  the	  reelection	  of	  Vázquez	  following	  a	  runoff	  election	  against	  opposition	  candidate	  Luis	  Alberto	  Lacalle	  Pou	  of	  the	  Blancos	  on	  20	  November	  2014.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Adult	  males	  were	  granted	  universal	  suffrage	  in	  1918.	  Total	  suffrage	  was	  granted	  in	  1932.	  See	  Charles	  Gillespie,	  “Democratic	  Consolidation	  in	  Uruguay”	  in	  Elites	  and	  
Democratic	  Consolidation	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  Southern	  Europe	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  179-­‐80.	  	  4	  Including	  an	  overall	  score,	  the	  EIU	  measures	  the	  democracy	  index	  using	  five	  criteria:	  electoral	  process	  and	  pluralism,	  functioning	  of	  government,	  political	  participation,	  political	  culture,	  and	  civil	  liberties.	  See	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit.	  http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy0814.	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The	  election	  of	  Tabaré	  Vázquez	  in	  2004	  marks	  a	  historic	  change	  in	  the	  Uruguayan	  political	  tradition.	  The	  Frente	  Amplio	  was	  founded	  as	  a	  coalition	  of	  more	  than	  a	  dozen	  fractured	  leftist	  parties	  (many	  of	  which	  separated	  from	  the	  Colorados)	  and	  movements	  in	  1971,	  during	  period	  defined	  by	  increased	  governmental	  authoritarianism.	  It	  was	  during	  this	  time	  that	  the	  Movimiento	  de	  Liberación	  
Nacional-­‐Tupamaros	  (Movement	  of	  National	  Liberation-­‐Tupamaros,	  MLN-­‐T),	  was	  all	  but	  eliminated	  as	  a	  guerrilla	  movement.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1972,	  its	  entire	  membership	  was	  either	  captured,	  killed	  or	  in	  exile.	  Finally,	  in	  1973,	  Juan	  María	  Bordaberry	  Arocena	  closed	  parliament	  and	  imposed	  direct	  rule	  from	  a	  military	  junta.	  The	  newly	  established	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship	  outlawed	  trade	  unions	  and	  political	  parties	  and	  embarked	  on	  a	  campaign	  of	  intense	  government	  repression	  that	  lasted	  throughout	  the	  1970s.	  Political	  parties	  began	  to	  reorganize	  in	  the	  1980s,	  following	  the	  rejection	  of	  a	  constitutional	  referendum	  to	  legitimize	  the	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship,	  and,	  following	  the	  1984	  national	  elections,	  the	  dictatorship	  officially	  ended.	  In	  1989,	  the	  Tupamaros	  were	  admitted	  to	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
Movimiento	  de	  Participación	  Popular	  (Movement	  of	  Popular	  Participation,	  MPP)	  political	  party.	  Since	  the	  beginning	  of	  their	  participation	  in	  national	  elections	  in	  1994,	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  has	  grown	  into	  Uruguay’s	  most	  potent	  political	  force.	  	  In	  his	  book,	  Negotiating	  Democracy:	  Politicians	  and	  Generals	  in	  Uruguay,	  Gillespie	  identifies	  three	  gaps	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  examines	  these	  periods	  of	  democratic	  transition	  in	  Latin	  America:	  1 overemphasis	  on	  the	  onset	  of	  bureaucratic	  authoritarianism,	  which	  led	  to	  neglect	  of	  the	  subsequent	  problems	  of	  institutionalization,	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2 the	  downplaying	  of	  political	  institutions,	  and	  especially	  parties,	  and	  a	  tendency	  to	  reduce	  political	  phenomena	  to	  economic	  causes,	  and	  3 lack	  of	  attention	  to	  the	  Uruguayan	  case,	  which,	  because	  of	  the	  weight	  of	  political	  institutions	  and	  democratic	  political	  culture,	  shows	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  alliance	  between	  the	  state	  and	  fractions	  of	  the	  bourgeoisie.5	  
	  This	  investigation	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Tupamaros	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  into	  Uruguay’s	  political	  structure	  from	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  MLN-­‐T	  through	  the	  reelection	  of	  Tabaré	  Vázquez	  in	  2014.	  Since	  their	  admission	  to	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  in	  1989,	  the	  MPP	  has	  become	  the	  largest	  faction	  within	  the	  coalition	  and	  has	  elected	  one	  president—José	  Mujíca—a	  former	  guerrilla	  member.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  Tupamaros	  contributed	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Frente	  Amplio,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  outline	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Uruguayan	  political	  structure,	  including	  the	  tradition	  of	  two-­‐party	  dominance	  alongside	  the	  development	  of	  an	  institutional	  framework,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  economic	  and	  cultural	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  fractionalization	  of	  the	  traditional	  parties	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Therefore,	  this	  chapter	  chronicles	  the	  formation	  of	  Uruguay’s	  two	  so-­‐called	  “traditional”	  parties,	  the	  Colorados	  and	  the	  Blancos,	  until	  1958,	  when	  the	  Blancos	  seized	  power	  from	  the	  Colorados	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1865.	  
La	  República	  Oriental	  de	  Uruguay	  officially	  declared	  its	  independence	  from	  the	  Brazilian	  Empire	  on	  25	  August	  1825	  in	  response	  to	  the	  annexation	  of	  Brazil	  from	  the	  Portuguese	  in	  1822.	  However,	  Uruguay	  as	  an	  independent	  state	  did	  not	  emerge	  until	  1828,	  after	  the	  British	  mediated	  a	  negotiation	  between	  the	  United	  Provinces	  of	  the	  Río	  de	  la	  Plata	  (present-­‐day	  Argentina)	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  Empire	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Charles	  Gillespie,	  Negotiating	  Democracy:	  Politicians	  and	  Generals	  in	  Uruguay	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1991),	  3.	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recognize	  the	  Republic’s	  independence,	  and,	  in	  1830,	  the	  nation	  adopted	  its	  first	  constitution.	  The	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Republic	  posed	  challenges	  for	  the	  newly	  independent	  nation.	  Uruguay’s	  ostensible	  tradition	  of	  political	  bipartisanship	  emerged	  during	  this	  post-­‐independent	  period,	  which	  was	  defined	  by	  a	  series	  of	  civil	  wars	  that	  forged	  political	  alliances	  in	  the	  nascent	  nation-­‐state.	  According	  to	  Uruguayan	  political	  scientist	  Luis	  E.	  González,	  the	  Uruguayan	  Civil	  War	  (1839	  –	  1851)	  established	  “political	  organizations	  with	  mass	  following—and	  even	  armies—and	  they	  survived	  uninterruptedly	  into	  the	  present.	  These	  parties,	  also	  called	  “traditional”	  parties,	  were	  born	  out	  of	  the	  following	  of	  the	  leading	  caudillos	  in	  the	  post-­‐independence	  years.”6	  The	  Guerra	  Grande,	  then,	  as	  it	  is	  known	  in	  Spanish,	  was	  a	  decisive	  moment	  in	  the	  development	  of	  Uruguay’s	  two	  traditional	  parties,	  the	  Colorados	  and	  the	  Blancos.7	  The	  “Colorado	  cupula	  included	  a	  predominance	  of	  urban	  notables,	  a	  fair	  number	  of	  families	  descended	  from	  Italian	  and	  other	  immigrants,	  many	  lawyers	  (known	  in	  Uruguay	  as	  doctores),	  intellectuals,	  and	  people	  engaged	  in	  commerce,”	  while	  “Such	  strata	  tended	  to	  be	  less	  well	  represented	  in	  the	  Blanco	  party,	  where	  traditional	  (criollo)	  elites,	  especially	  large	  landowners,	  retained	  a	  stronger	  position.”8	  The	  final	  defeat	  of	  the	  Blancos	  in	  1851	  ushered	  in	  a	  near-­‐century	  of	  Colorado	  rule,	  and,	  despite	  a	  series	  of	  nonconsecutive	  dictatorships	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  war	  had	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  Argentinians	  and	  Brazilians,	  the	  former’s	  whose	  more	  liberal,	  urban-­‐centered	  and	  antichurch	  interests	  conflicted	  with	  the	  latter’s	  landed	  interests,	  giving	  rise	  to	  the	  respective	  party	  lines	  of	  the	  Colorados	  and	  the	  Blancos.	  See	  Luis	  González,	  Political	  Structures	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Uruguay	  (Notre	  Dame,	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  1992),	  13.	  	  7	  The	  names	  Colorado	  and	  Blanco	  mean	  red	  and	  white	  and	  refer	  purely	  to	  headbands	  worn	  by	  the	  combatants	  in	  the	  civil	  wars,	  not	  the	  colors	  of	  revolution	  and	  reaction.	  See	  Gillespie,	  Negotiating	  Democracy,	  17.	  	  8	  Ibid.,	  19.	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nineteenth	  century,	  the	  Colorados	  maintained	  relative	  control	  of	  the	  national	  government	  between	  1865	  and	  1958.	  During	  that	  time,	  “The	  National	  party	  survived	  as	  a	  party	  of	  protest,	  defending	  the	  periphery	  against	  the	  center	  (Montevideo),	  tending	  to	  side	  with	  export-­‐oriented	  ranching	  interests	  against	  the	  increasing	  pressure	  of	  the	  urban	  industrial	  sector	  that	  grew	  under	  state	  protection.”9	  	  In	  his	  book,	  Political	  Structures	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Uruguay,	  González	  defines	  the	  significance	  of	  Uruguay’s	  two	  traditional	  parties	  within	  the	  nation’s	  political	  structure.	  Regardless	  of	  interpretations	  that	  define	  Uruguay’s	  political	  structure	  as	  a	  predominant	  party	  system	  within	  a	  two	  party	  format	  or	  a	  disguised	  multiparty	  system,	  González	  explains	  that	  “Uruguay	  has	  had	  two	  major	  parties,	  Blancos	  and	  Colorados,	  since	  the	  nineteenth	  century;	  these	  parties	  competed	  within	  a	  two-­‐party	  
format	  until	  the	  mid-­‐sixties,	  and	  under	  democratic	  governments	  they	  defined	  a	  two-­‐party	  system	  most	  of	  the	  time.”10	  Moreover,	  González	  argues	  that	  two	  main	  features	  have	  characterized	  this	  institutional	  setting:	  the	  quasi-­‐presidentialism	  of	  Uruguayan	  constitutional	  tradition	  and	  a	  few,	  key	  principles	  of	  Uruguayan	  electoral	  law,	  namely	  proportional	  representation	  in	  the	  election	  of	  both	  chambers;	  closed	  and	  rigid	  lists;	  double	  simultaneous	  vote;	  and	  simple	  plurality	  to	  decide	  which	  party	  wins	  the	  presidency.	  In	  addition,	  in	  1934	  another	  law	  was	  implemented	  stipulating	  that	  all	  elections	  occur	  together	  at	  once	  every	  four	  years.	  That	  law	  was	  modified	  to	  once	  every	  five	  years	  in	  1966,	  and	  has	  been	  maintained	  in	  all	  elections	  since	  then—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Ibid.,	  18.	  	  	  10	  González,	  19.	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excluding	  the	  period	  of	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship.11	  While	  on	  one	  hand	  these	  features	  explain	  the	  historic	  stability	  of	  the	  Uruguayan	  political	  structure,	  they	  also	  provide	  this	  investigation	  with	  insight	  into	  the	  institutional	  setting	  that	  facilitated	  the	  eventual	  fractionalization	  of	  the	  traditional	  parties	  in	  the	  1960s,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  economic	  and	  cultural	  changes	  that	  occurred	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  into	  the	  twentieth.	  These	  features	  were	  largely	  consolidated	  during	  a	  political	  period	  known	  as	  
Batllismo.	  Coined	  after	  Colorado	  President	  José	  Pablo	  Torcuato	  Batlle	  y	  Ordóñez	  (1903-­‐07,	  1911-­‐15),	  Batllismo	  was	  “an	  ideology	  that	  would	  transform	  and	  dominate	  Uruguayan	  politics	  and	  political	  institutions	  for	  thirty	  years,	  color	  it	  until	  the	  present,	  but	  ultimately	  fail”	  when	  constitutional	  reforms	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	  social	  policies	  could	  no	  longer	  prevent	  the	  overextension	  of	  bureaucratic	  power.12	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	  Blancos	  staged	  another	  insurrection	  following	  Batlle’s	  inauguration	  in	  1903.	  However,	  their	  military	  defeat	  in	  1904	  signified	  “the	  triumph	  of	  Montevideo	  over	  the	  caudillos	  of	  the	  interior	  oligarchy”	  and	  brought	  an	  end	  to	  a	  political	  period	  characterized	  by	  the	  parceling	  out	  of	  power	  between	  the	  two	  traditional	  parties.13	  	   Batlle	  was	  born	  in	  Montevideo	  to	  a	  politically	  active	  family	  affiliated	  with	  the	  Colorado	  Party.	  In	  fact,	  his	  father,	  Lorenzo	  Cristóbal	  Manuel	  Batlle	  y	  Grau,	  was	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  González,	  19-­‐23.	  12	  Martin	  Weinstein,	  Uruguay:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Failure	  (Westport:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1975),	  20.	  13	  The	  ultimate	  defeat	  of	  the	  Blancos	  also	  signified	  the	  victory	  for	  the	  rural	  enclosures	  over	  their	  displaced	  victims.	  The	  “oligarchy”	  was	  irrevocably	  weakened	  and	  forced	  to	  share	  the	  ship	  of	  state	  with	  the	  sizable	  rural	  “middle	  class”	  and	  the	  urban	  bourgeoisie.	  See	  Gillespie,	  “Democratic	  Consolidation	  in	  Uruguay,”	  180.	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general	  of	  the	  army	  and	  president	  of	  the	  Republic	  from	  1868	  to	  1872,	  when	  a	  military	  uprising	  overthrew	  him.	  Unsurprisingly,	  Batlle	  was	  politically	  involved	  from	  an	  early	  age;	  in	  particular,	  he	  was	  committed	  to	  social	  progress.	  During	  his	  time	  as	  a	  student	  at	  the	  Universidad	  de	  la	  República,	  he	  led	  a	  student	  group	  rallying	  for	  social	  reform.	  However,	  the	  onset	  of	  Uruguay’s	  first	  true	  military	  dictatorship	  in	  1876	  discouraged	  him,	  and	  in	  1879	  he	  left	  school	  to	  travel	  in	  Europe.	  Upon	  his	  return	  to	  Uruguay	  in	  1881,	  Batlle	  recommitted	  himself	  to	  achieving	  social	  progress	  in	  Uruguay.	  In	  1886,	  he	  founded	  the	  leftist	  publication	  El	  Día,	  and	  in	  1890	  he	  joined	  the	  Colorado	  Party.	   Eventually,	  after	  ascending	  many	  political	  positions,	  Batlle	  was	  elected	  president	  in	  1902.	  	   Two	  factors	  were	  especially	  important	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  Batlle’s	  government	  policy.	  First,	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  the	  first	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  saw	  a	  huge	  influx	  of	  immigrants,	  primarily	  from	  Latin	  Europe,	  into	  the	  port	  of	  Montevideo	  and	  surrounding	  agricultural	  region.	  “The	  influx	  of	  Spaniards	  and	  Italians	  saw	  an	  increasing	  labor	  militancy	  which	  borrowed	  much	  of	  its	  ideological	  strength	  from	  syndicalist	  and	  anarcho-­‐syndicalist	  theories	  imported	  from	  Europe.”14	  Second,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  civil	  war	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  period	  of	  economic	  growth—sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  period	  of	  economic	  “boom”—driven	  primarily	  by	  both	  the	  increased	  demand	  for	  and	  export	  of	  wool	  on	  the	  world	  market.	  These	  two	  factors	  transformed	  Uruguayan	  society;	  Montevideo	  developed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Between	  1860	  and	  1904,	  the	  population	  grew	  from	  some	  200,000	  to	  over	  1	  million.	  In	  the	  years	  following,	  sociedades	  de	  resistencia	  were	  formed.	  In	  1905	  the	  first	  nationwide	  syndicate	  (FORU-­‐Workers	  Federation	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Uruguay)	  was	  established,	  and	  in	  1910	  the	  Socialist	  Party	  of	  Uruguay	  was	  formed.	  See	  Weinstein,	  21.	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into	  the	  industrial	  center	  of	  the	  Uruguayan	  supply	  chain.	  Given	  this	  period	  of	  rapid	  industrialization,	  “the	  challenge	  for	  Batlle	  and	  his	  lieutenants	  within	  the	  Colorado	  party	  was	  to	  integrate	  this	  new	  and	  overwhelmingly	  urban	  mass	  into	  society	  at	  large	  and	  the	  Colorado	  party	  in	  particular.”15	  	  	   Consequently,	  Batlle	  implemented	  a	  pro-­‐labor	  government	  policy	  that	  had	  strong	  roots	  in	  an	  ideological	  framework	  “that	  accepted	  state	  intervention	  as	  a	  means	  to	  control	  conflict	  within	  the	  society.”16	  However,	  according	  to	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  economist	  Alex	  Segura-­‐Ubiergo	  in	  his	  book,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  
the	  Welfare	  State	  in	  Latin	  America:	  Globalization,	  Democracy,	  and	  Development,	  “In	  Uruguay,	  the	  welfare	  state	  emerged	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  “nation-­‐building”	  strategy,”	  rather	  than	  “as	  a	  response	  to	  bottom-­‐up	  pressures	  exerted	  from	  increasingly	  better	  organized	  and	  powerful	  groups	  of	  civil	  society	  –	  especially	  the	  labor	  movement,”	  as	  it	  had	  in	  Chile.17	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  regulatory	  legislation,	  Batlle	  created	  industrial	  state	  units	  (entes	  autónomos)	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  carrying	  out	  “the	  necessary	  economic	  activities	  of	  the	  state.”18	  According	  to	  Gillespie,	  these	  circumstances	  ”enabled	  the	  Colorados	  to	  transform	  what	  had	  been	  a	  patrician	  party	  into	  a	  powerful	  mass	  political	  machine,	  and	  it	  was	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  the	  Colorados’	  hegemony	  was	  reconstructed.”19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Weinstein,	  21.	  	  16	  During	  his	  first	  administration,	  he	  began	  to	  propose	  the	  legislation	  of	  hours,	  safety,	  and	  retirement	  that	  slowly	  but	  surely	  became	  the	  backbone	  of	  labor	  legislation	  in	  Uruguay	  over	  the	  next	  fifteen	  years.	  See	  Weinstein,	  21.	  17	  Alex	  Segura-­‐Ubiergo,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Welfare	  State	  in	  Latin	  America:	  
Globalization,	  Democracy,	  and	  Development	  (Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  58.	  18	  Weinstein,	  24.	  	  19	  Gillespie,	  “Democratic	  Consolidation	  in	  Uruguay,”	  180.	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   Batlle’s	  principles	  became	  the	  dominant	  ideology	  of	  the	  Colorados	  and	  continued	  to	  dominate	  Uruguayan	  politics	  long	  after	  his	  death	  in	  1929.	  One	  of	  his	  principal	  beliefs	  concerned	  the	  overconcentration	  of	  state	  power.	  However,	  despite	  Batlle’s	  effort	  to	  implement	  power-­‐sharing	  practices	  by	  implementing	  electoral	  and	  constitutional	  reform,	  internal	  conflict	  and	  factionalism	  increased	  between	  the	  Colorados	  and	  the	  Blancos	  throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  double	  simultaneous	  vote	  (DSV)	  in	  1910.	  Under	  the	  system	  of	  the	  double	  simultaneous	  vote,	  citizens	  must	  choose	  among	  many	  competing	  lists	  of	  candidates	  in	  their	  favored	  party	  (technically	  known	  as	  a	  lema).	  Each	  lists	  corresponds	  to	  a	  different	  faction,	  and	  this	  allows	  the	  various	  Blanco	  and	  Colorado	  factions	  to	  persist	  side	  by	  side	  without	  splitting	  the	  parties.	  In	  fact,	  winning	  elections	  requires	  that	  they	  not	  split,	  however	  artificial	  their	  unity.20	  	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  double	  simultaneous	  vote	  encouraged	  the	  development	  of	  factions	  within	  the	  Colorados	  and	  the	  Blancos,	  because	  it	  expanded	  the	  opportunity	  for	  them	  to	  gain	  proportional	  representation	  in	  the	  lower	  house	  while	  still	  promoting	  a	  single	  presidential	  candidate.	  The	  second	  reform	  was	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  1918	  constitution.	  In	  addition	  to	  officially	  declaring	  democracy	  in	  Uruguay,	  the	  reform	  established	  a	  “nine-­‐member	  National	  Council	  of	  Administration,	  alongside	  the	  presidency,	  to	  handle	  domestic	  affairs;	  three	  of	  those	  seats	  in	  what	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Uruguay	  combines	  its	  double	  simultaneous	  vote	  with	  strict	  proportional	  representation.	  Therefore,	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  their	  representation	  in	  legislative	  elections	  (held	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  presidential	  election),	  several	  factional	  lists	  in	  a	  given	  party	  may	  form	  alliances	  known	  as	  sublemas.	  These	  support	  a	  single	  candidate	  for	  president	  and	  usually	  have	  the	  same	  list	  of	  names	  for	  the	  Senate,	  but	  each	  has	  a	  different	  candidate	  list	  for	  the	  Chamber	  of	  Deputies.	  As	  in	  the	  presidential	  race,	  the	  votes	  for	  all	  the	  lists	  in	  a	  sublema	  are	  pooled.	  Several	  small	  factions	  may	  in	  this	  way	  manage	  to	  win	  one	  seat	  in	  the	  lower	  house	  that	  they	  might	  otherwise	  not	  have	  won.	  Two	  or	  more	  larger	  fractions	  may	  also	  win	  an	  extra	  congressional	  seat	  by	  forming	  a	  sublema.	  See	  Gillespie,	  Negotiating	  Democracy,	  21.	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was	  often	  called	  the	  colegiado	  were	  reserved	  for	  the	  opposition	  –	  in	  practice,	  the	  Blancos.”21	  Although	  these	  electoral	  and	  constitutional	  reforms	  promoted	  the	  idea	  of	  
coparticipación	  (co-­‐participation),	  in	  reality	  they	  exacerbated	  increasing	  factionalism,	  especially	  within	  the	  Colorados.	  	   The	  viability	  of	  the	  two-­‐party	  system	  declined	  in	  the	  1930s.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1920s,	  two	  major	  events	  occurred	  that	  raised	  concern	  within	  the	  Batllista	  faction	  of	  the	  Colorados.	  In	  1929,	  the	  famed	  leader	  of	  the	  Batllistas,	  José	  Batlle	  y	  Ordóñez,	  died,	  signaling	  uncertainty	  for	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  faction.	  Only	  weeks	  later,	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Market	  crashed,	  precipitating	  a	  period	  of	  profound	  economic	  downturn.	  In	  1930,	  following	  this	  period	  of	  confusion,	  Dr.	  Gabriel	  Terra	  Leivas,	  a	  heterodox	  member	  of	  the	  Batllistas,	  was	  elected	  president,	  and,	  in	  1933,	  he	  staged	  a	  coup	  d’état	  that	  had	  the	  support	  of	  both	  the	  Riverista	  faction	  of	  the	  Colorados	  and	  Luis	  Alberto	  de	  Herrera	  y	  Quevado	  and	  the	  Herrerista	  faction	  of	  the	  Blancos.	  Terra	  suspended	  congress,	  disbanded	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Administration,	  and	  implemented	  a	  constitutional	  reform	  that	  merged	  states	  powers	  with	  the	  president.	  	  	   Even	  so,	  Terra	  largely	  continued	  along	  the	  path	  of	  social	  reform	  implemented	  by	  his	  predecessors	  within	  the	  Colorado	  Party.	  According	  to	  Gillespie:	  As	  in	  other	  nations	  of	  Latin	  America,	  the	  disastrous	  short-­‐term	  impact	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression	  was	  more	  than	  compensated	  for	  by	  the	  long-­‐run	  boost	  to	  industrialization	  of	  the	  domestic	  economy	  necessitated	  by	  the	  sudden	  lack	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  to	  purchase	  manufactured	  imports.	  During	  the	  1930s,	  the	  state	  took	  the	  initiative	  in	  developing	  basic	  industries	  such	  as	  oil	  refining	  and	  cement	  production.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  president	  controlled	  foreign	  relations,	  national	  security,	  and	  agriculture,	  while	  the	  National	  Council	  of	  Administration	  administered	  all	  other	  executive	  governmental	  functions	  including	  industrial	  relations,	  health,	  public	  works,	  industry	  and	  labor,	  livestock	  and	  agriculture,	  education,	  and	  the	  preparation	  of	  the	  budget.	  Ibid.,	  20.	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decade	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  which	  saw	  rapid	  progress	  in	  import-­‐substituting	  industrialization	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Economic	  Commission	  for	  Latin	  America,	  represented	  the	  farthest	  logical	  development	  of	  the	  Batllista	  model.	  That	  period	  of	  prosperity	  concluded	  shortly	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  fully	  collegial	  executive,	  instead	  of	  the	  presidency,	  in	  1951.2223	  
	  By	  this	  time,	  the	  Batllista	  model	  of	  economic	  growth	  had	  exhausted	  itself;	  industrial-­‐oriented	  growth	  could	  not	  support	  the	  economy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  decreased	  global	  demand	  for	  Uruguay’s	  agricultural	  exports.	  In	  addition,	  economic	  crisis	  exacerbated	  growing	  concerns	  among	  increasingly	  organized	  interest	  groups.	  The	  formation	  of	  the	  full	  colegiado	  all	  but	  guaranteed	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  two-­‐party	  system	  in	  Uruguay,	  as	  it	  diluted	  the	  executive	  powers	  of	  the	  president,	  increasing	  factionalism	  between	  the	  two	  parties.	  This	  combination	  of	  forces	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  Blanco	  victory	  in	  the	  1958	  elections,	  which	  initiated	  a	  period	  of	  profound	  democratic	  transition	  in	  Uruguay	  that	  would	  ultimately	  result	  in	  the	  founding	  of	  the	  Tupamaros	  and	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  Uruguay’s	  two	  traditional	  parties.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Gillespie,	  Negotiating	  Democracy,	  22.	  	  23	  The	  1952	  Constitution	  produced	  the	  weakest	  chiefs	  of	  state	  since	  1918.	  It	  would	  have	  been	  far	  more	  difficult	  for	  a	  member	  of	  the	  colegiado	  to	  head	  a	  coup	  like	  that	  of	  President	  Terra	  in	  1933;	  according	  to	  Batlle	  y	  Ordóñez	  this	  was,	  in	  fact,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  virtues	  of	  the	  colegiado.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  the	  voters,	  however,	  they	  were	  still	  voting	  for	  president—only	  that	  this	  time	  there	  were	  four,	  one	  for	  each	  year—and	  the	  candidates	  were	  the	  most	  important	  leaders	  of	  the	  competing	  parties	  and	  fractions.	  See	  González,	  22.	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THE	  TUPAMAROS:	  THEORY	  VS	  PRACTICE,	  1958	  –	  1973	  	  	   The	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  guerrilla	  warfare	  in	  Latin	  America	  has	  roots	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  socialism	  and	  the	  armed	  struggle	  popularized	  by	  theorists	  like	  Karl	  Marx,	  Frederick	  Engels,	  Vladimir	  Lenin,	  and	  Mao	  Tse-­‐tung,	  to	  name	  a	  few.24	  However,	  the	  revolutionary	  process	  in	  Latin	  America	  and,	  by	  consequence,	  Uruguay,	  broke	  with	  traditional	  theory.	  We	  have	  already	  discussed	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  as	  a	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Tupamaros.	  However,	  now	  we	  must	  examine	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  upon	  which	  the	  Tupamaros	  built	  their	  own	  revolutionary	  ideology.	  After	  all,	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  was,	  in	  large	  part,	  fought	  in	  the	  lush	  and	  mountainous	  Cuban	  countryside,	  whereas	  the	  Tupamaros	  almost	  exclusively	  operated	  within	  the	  urban	  areas	  like	  Montevideo.	  Even	  so,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  examine	  the	  inextricable	  theoretical	  link	  between	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  and	  the	  Uruguayan	  experience.	  	  	   According	  to	  Che	  Guevara,	  guerrilla	  action	  was	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  political	  power	  in	  Latin	  America,	  and	  the	  rural	  foco	  (“focus”	  or	  “nucleus”),	  or	  cadres	  of	  revolutionaries	  based	  in	  the	  countryside,	  would	  develop	  popular	  support	  for	  the	  revolutionary	  movement	  toward	  such	  power.	  Although	  influenced	  by	  Marxism-­‐Leninism,	  Guevara’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  foco	  challenged	  the	  traditional	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  conception	  about	  the	  necessity	  to	  organize	  around	  a	  vanguard	  party	  (organizations	  of	  class-­‐conscious	  and	  politically	  advanced	  sections	  of	  the	  proletariat	  or	  working	  class)	  in	  order	  to	  begin	  the	  revolutionary	  process.	  Instead,	  foquismo	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  See	  Karl	  Marx	  (1854),	  Friedrich	  Engels	  (1870),	  Vladimir	  Lenin	  (1906),	  and	  Mao	  Tse-­‐tung	  (1936).	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(“foco	  theory”)	  posited	  that,	  since	  the	  objective	  conditions	  for	  revolution	  already	  existed	  in	  most	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  a	  foco	  to	  initiate	  the	  revolutionary	  process.	  Overall,	  Guevara	  believed	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  made	  three	  important	  contributions	  to	  this	  movement	  in	  Latin	  America.	  In	  “Guerilla	  warefare:	  A	  method”	  he	  states:	  First,	  people’s	  forces	  can	  win	  a	  war	  against	  the	  army.	  Second,	  it	  is	  not	  always	  necessary	  to	  wait	  for	  all	  conditions	  favorable	  to	  revolution	  to	  be	  present;	  the	  insurrection	  itself	  can	  create	  them,	  Third,	  in	  the	  underdeveloped	  parts	  of	  America,	  the	  battleground	  for	  armed	  struggle	  should	  in	  the	  main	  be	  the	  countryside.	  (Ernesto	  Che	  Guevara,	  
Guerrilla	  Warfare)”25	  	  Although	  Guevara	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  rural	  foco	  best	  served	  the	  revolutionary	  process	  in	  Latin	  America,	  such	  conditions	  did	  not	  exist,	  or	  were	  at	  least	  less	  apparent,	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  region	  like	  Chile	  and	  Uruguay.26	  For	  example,	  by	  the	  1960s,	  nearly	  half	  the	  population	  of	  Uruguay	  lived	  in	  Montevideo,	  and,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  city’s	  urban	  classes	  had	  long	  been	  organizing	  themselves	  politically	  before	  rural	  demonstrations	  entered	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Even	  then,	  the	  most	  successful	  demonstrations	  took	  place	  in	  Montevideo.	  Even	  so,	  other	  philosophers	  like	  Régis	  Debray,	  a	  Cuban	  Revolution	  sympathizer	  who	  joined	  Guevara’s	  efforts	  in	  Bolivia	  and	  was	  later	  detained	  as	  a	  result,	  began	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Che	  Guevara,	  “Guerrilla	  Warfare:	  A	  Method”	  in	  Che	  Guevara	  Reader:	  Writings	  on	  
Politics	  &	  Revolution,	  ed.	  David	  Deutschmann	  (Ocean	  Press,	  2003).	  26	  At	  a	  speech	  at	  Montevideo’s	  Universidad	  de	  la	  República	  on	  17	  August	  1961,	  Guevara	  commended	  Uruguay	  for	  its	  democratic	  freedom	  within	  Latin	  America.	  In	  addition,	  he	  advised	  the	  Uruguayan	  left	  to	  use	  all	  available	  democratic	  tactics	  to	  enact	  change	  before	  resorting	  to	  violence.	  Ironically,	  counterrevolutionaries	  sprayed	  the	  auditorium	  with	  stink	  bombs	  before	  Che	  Guevara	  delivered	  his	  speech.	  In	  addition,	  an	  assassin	  attempted	  to	  take	  his	  life	  following	  the	  speech,	  but	  ended	  up	  killing	  educator.	  Papers.	  See	  Che	  Guevara,	  “El	  “Che”	  Guevara	  habla	  en	  la	  Universidad	  de	  la	  República	  (Montevideo,	  17	  August	  1961).	  http://medios.elpais.com.uy/downloads/2007/HistoriaReciente/19.pdf.	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popularize	  and	  adapt	  foquismo	  to	  an	  urban	  setting.	  In	  his	  two	  seminal	  works,	  
Revolution	  in	  the	  Revolution?	  Armed	  Struggle	  and	  Political	  Struggle	  in	  Latin	  America	  and	  Strategy	  for	  Revolution,	  Debray	  expanded	  upon	  Guevera’s	  revolutionary	  ideology,	  arguing	  that	  foco	  did	  not	  necessarily	  best	  operate	  in	  the	  countryside.	  Debray	  even	  went	  on	  later	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Tupamaros	  were	  “the	  only	  armed	  revolutionary	  movement	  in	  Latin	  America	  who	  knew	  how,	  or	  was	  able,	  to	  attack	  on	  all	  front	  (and	  not	  only	  at	  one	  point	  or	  one	  side)	  and	  to	  neutralize	  the	  bourgeois	  and	  anti-­‐national	  dictatorship,	  questioning	  its	  very	  survival.”27	  As	  urban	  guerrilla	  movements	  began	  to	  propagate	  across	  Latin	  America,	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  such	  ideology	  alone	  failed	  to	  explain	  the	  success	  of	  such	  groups	  as	  the	  Movimiento	  de	  Izquierda	  Revolucionaria	  (Movement	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  Left,	  MIR)	  in	  Chile	  and	  the	  Tupamaros	  in	  Uruguay.	  Richard	  Gillespie	  writes	  about	  the	  Tupamaros,	  “Originally	  Cuban	  influenced,	  their	  subsequent	  expertise	  in	  urban	  guerrilla	  warfare	  owed	  more	  to	  collaboration	  with	  Argentine	  Peronist	  guerrillas,	  the	  strategic	  thinking	  of	  Spanish	  Civil	  War	  veteran	  Abraham	  Guillén	  and	  the	  study	  of	  the	  Algerian	  guerrilla,”	  and,	  later,	  to	  some	  extent,	  Carlos	  Marighella,	  founder	  of	  the	  Ação	  
Libertadora	  Nacional	  (Action	  for	  National	  Liberation,	  ALN)	  in	  Brazil,	  among	  others.28	  The	  work	  of	  Abraham	  Guillén	  is	  particularly	  potent.	  Guillén	  was	  a	  passionate	  advocate	  of	  urban	  guerrilla	  strategy.	  According	  to	  him,	  “If	  70	  percent	  of	  a	  country’s	  population	  is	  urban	  the	  demography	  and	  the	  economy	  must	  dictate	  the	  specific	  rules	  of	  the	  strategy	  of	  revolutionary	  combat.	  The	  center	  of	  operations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Régis	  Debray,	  “Appredre	  d’eux,”	  in	  Noux	  les	  Tupamaros	  (Paris:	  Fraçois	  Maspéro,	  1971),	  209-­‐210.	  28	  Richard	  Gillespie,	  “A	  Critique	  of	  the	  Urban	  Guerrilla:	  Argentina,	  Uruguay	  and	  Brazil,”	  in	  Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Studies	  1,	  no.	  2	  (1980),	  39-­‐53.	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should	  never	  in	  the	  mountains	  or	  in	  the	  villages,	  but	  in	  the	  largest	  cities	  where	  the	  population	  suffices	  to	  form	  the	  army	  of	  the	  revolution.”29	  Although	  later	  Guillén	  would	  criticize	  the	  Tupamaros’	  revolutionary	  strategy,	  he	  provided	  them	  with	  an	  important	  ideological	  framework	  upon	  which	  to	  rationalize	  their	  actions.	  	  	  Executing	  the	  Revolution:	  Theory	  vs.	  Practice	  	   As	  discussed	  in	  previous	  chapters,	  Uruguay’s	  rapid	  economic	  decline	  exacerbated	  labor	  disputes	  in	  both	  the	  city	  and	  countryside,	  as	  well	  as	  highlighted	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  Uruguayan	  political	  system.	  By	  the	  1960s,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  neither	  the	  Colorados	  nor	  the	  governing	  Blancos	  were	  capable	  of	  properly	  amending	  Uruguay’s	  failing	  economic	  policies.	  “At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  1962	  elections	  inflation	  was	  running	  at	  35	  percent	  a	  year,	  a	  high	  figure	  for	  a	  country	  whose	  currency	  had	  been	  as	  stable	  as	  the	  dollar	  throughout	  the	  1940s	  and	  early	  1950s	  and	  for	  an	  economy	  which	  had	  not	  experienced	  an	  inflation	  greater	  than	  15	  to	  18	  percent	  in	  decades.”30	  Even	  so,	  Uruguay’s	  tired	  out	  political	  system	  still	  prevented	  opposition	  parties	  from	  attaining	  the	  presidency,	  despite	  growing	  divisions	  within	  the	  party	  (Incorporate	  González	  text).	  According	  to	  Assistant	  Professor	  of	  History	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Central	  Oklahoma	  Lindsey	  Churchill	  in	  her	  book,	  Becoming	  the	  
Tupamaros:	  Solidarity	  and	  Transnational	  Revolutionaries	  in	  Uruguay	  and	  the	  United	  
States,	  “in	  the	  1962	  national	  elections,	  the	  Uruguayan	  Communist	  Party	  received	  3.6	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Abraham	  Guillen,	  Estrategia	  de	  la	  guerrilla	  urbana	  (1971),	  translated	  in	  Donald	  C.	  Hodges,	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Urban	  Guerrilla	  (New	  York,	  1973).	  30	  Weinstein,	  114.	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percent	  of	  the	  vote,	  and	  the	  socialist-­‐led	  Unión	  Popular	  only	  2.3	  percent,”	  despite	  worsening	  economic	  conditions.31	  	  	  Therefore,	  as	  certain	  divisions	  of	  the	  left	  became	  increasingly	  disenchanted	  with	  the	  political	  system,	  they	  sought	  armed	  struggle	  as	  the	  only	  means	  through	  which	  to	  incite	  widespread	  political	  change	  in	  Uruguay.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  Tupamaros	  were	  founded	  by	  Raúl	  Sendic	  and	  were	  initially	  comprised	  of	  members	  of	  the	  Coordinador.	  Tupamaros	  also	  absorbed	  members	  from	  various	  other	  organizations,	  including	  activists	  from	  groups	  such	  as	  UTAA,	  the	  Movimiento	  
Revolucionario	  Oriental	  (Oriental	  Revolutionary	  Movement,	  MRO),	  disillusioned	  young	  people	  in	  the	  Socialist	  Party,	  communists	  who	  formed	  the	  MIR,	  Trotskyites,	  Christians,	  and	  Independents,	  as	  well	  as	  recalcitrant	  students,	  members	  of	  labor	  unions,	  and	  intellectuals	  in	  both	  the	  city	  and	  countryside.32	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  Churchill,	  “Activists	  specifically	  broke	  with	  the	  MRO	  and	  joined	  the	  Tupamaros	  after	  the	  MRO	  promised	  to	  use	  its	  funds	  to	  help	  with	  the	  UTAA’s	  land	  occupation	  but	  instead	  funneled	  resources	  to	  electoral	  campaigns.”33	  In	  general,	  the	  Tupamaros’	  membership	  consisted	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  disillusioned	  Uruguayans	  representing	  an	  equally	  as	  diverse	  range	  of	  political	  ideologies.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Lindsey	  Churchill,	  Becoming	  the	  Tupamaros:	  Solidarity	  and	  Transnational	  
Revolutionaries	  in	  Uruguay	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  (Vanderbilt:	  Vanderbilt	  University	  Press,	  2014)	  10.	  32	  The	  MRO,	  founded	  in	  1962,	  consisted	  of	  young	  Uruguayans	  who	  studied	  guerrilla	  warfare	  and	  rejected	  the	  tactics	  of	  traditional	  Uruguayan	  left.	  Inspired	  by	  both	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution	  and	  their	  country’s	  dire	  economic	  situation,	  the	  group	  offered	  solidarity	  in	  the	  form	  of	  people	  and	  arms	  to	  radicalized	  labor	  movements.	  Eleuterio	  Fernández	  Huidobro	  was	  a	  former	  member	  of	  the	  MRO	  who	  joined	  the	  Tupamaros.	  	  Ibid.,	  12-­‐16.	  33	  Ibid.,	  15.	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Overall,	  the	  Tupamaros	  sought	  to	  break	  with	  Uruguay’s	  traditional	  electoral	  left	  and	  enact	  their	  own	  political	  change	  through	  urban	  guerrilla	  warfare.	  While	  on	  one	  hand	  the	  group	  consisted	  of	  various	  and	  diverse	  ideological	  backgrounds,	  on	  the	  other	  they	  attempted	  to	  rely	  less	  on	  theory	  and	  focus	  more	  on	  action.	  In	  1964,	  in	  “one	  of	  the	  MLN-­‐T’s	  first	  known	  documents,	  the	  group	  condemned	  the	  alleged	  inaction	  of	  the	  left	  by	  titling	  their	  paper	  “No	  Lamb	  Ever	  Saved	  Itself	  by	  Bleating.”	  In	  this	  document,	  the	  Tupamaros	  asserted	  the	  importance	  of	  armed	  struggle	  in	  Uruguay,	  particularly	  because	  of	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  crisis.”34	  In	  addition,	  “they	  characterized	  their	  armed	  struggle	  as	  predominately	  urban	  and	  part	  of	  a	  continental	  strategy	  of	  revolution.	  The	  MLN-­‐T	  also	  claimed	  that	  they	  operated	  only	  within	  the	  unique	  context	  of	  Uruguay.”35	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Tupamaros	  distinguished	  themselves	  among	  other	  revolutionary	  groups	  in	  Uruguay	  and	  within	  Latin	  America	  in	  general.	  Although	  they	  criticized	  the	  traditional	  left	  and	  suggested	  their	  goal	  of	  achieving	  both	  national	  liberation	  and	  socialism,	  the	  Tupamaros	  purported	  a	  tactical	  strategy	  more	  than	  ideological	  one.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Tupamaros’	  transition	  from	  armed	  propaganda	  to	  overt	  acts	  of	  violence	  highlights	  the	  group’s	  firm	  ideological	  contempt	  for	  what	  it	  considered	  an	  ineffective	  political	  system;	  the	  Tupamaros	  expanded	  the	  scope	  of	  their	  operations	  in	  response	  to	  severe	  economic	  stagnation	  and	  ineffective	  government	  policies	  to	  correct	  it,	  as	  well	  as	  increased	  government	  pressure	  to	  mitigate	  the	  guerrilla	  movement’s	  revolutionary	  efforts.	  This	  series	  of	  increasingly	  violent	  actions	  and	  reactions—insurgencies	  and	  counterinsurgencies—on	  behalf	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Ibid.,	  16.	  35	  Ibid.,	  15	  	  
	  	   36	  
the	  Tupamaros	  and	  the	  government	  throughout	  the	  1960s	  into	  the	  1970s	  eventually	  culminated	  in	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship	  in	  1973.	  As	  longstanding	  labor	  disputes	  persisted	  in	  the	  city	  (in	  Montevideo,	  in	  particular)	  and,	  to	  some	  extent,	  the	  countryside,	  the	  Tupamaros	  became	  a	  potent	  political	  force	  that	  instigated	  a	  government	  response	  to	  its	  actions	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  attempted	  to	  overthrow	  it.	  According	  to	  Ernest	  A.	  Duff,	  John	  F.	  McCamant,	  and	  Waltraud	  Q.	  Morales	  in	  their	  book,	  Violence	  and	  Repression	  in	  Latin	  America:	  a	  Quantitative	  and	  
Historical	  Analysis,	  in	  1969	  the	  Uruguayan	  government	  experienced	  more	  armed	  violence	  against	  it	  than	  any	  other	  government	  in	  Latin	  America,	  while,	  during	  the	  1950s,	  it	  experienced	  the	  least,	  among	  the	  20	  countries	  examined.	  Moreover,	  an	  Uruguayan	  Gallup	  poll	  taken	  in	  1972	  identified	  that	  the	  Tupamaros	  still	  “won	  widespread	  sympathy,	  and	  support,	  especially	  among	  youth	  on	  the	  Left,”	  in	  Uruguay,	  even	  if	  the	  majority	  totally	  rejected	  armed	  revolution	  as	  a	  means	  of	  political	  change	  and	  instead	  preferred	  that	  the	  government	  negotiate	  with	  the	  guerrilla	  movement’s	  leaders.36	  In	  turn,	  this	  evidence	  suggests	  that,	  despite	  ideological	  cleavages,	  the	  Tupamaros,	  to	  some	  degree,	  highlighted	  inherent	  problems	  in	  Uruguay’s	  political	  system.	  	  	  	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  as	  the	  Tupamaros’	  became	  increasingly	  sophisticated	  and	  successful	  in,	  among	  other	  things,	  outwitting	  the	  Uruguayan	  police,	  and	  the	  political-­‐economic	  system	  continued	  to	  decline,	  the	  military’s	  role	  in	  Uruguay	  expanded	  (largely	  with	  the	  help	  of	  U.S.	  Government	  agencies	  like	  USAID).	  According	  to	  Gillespie,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Gallup	  Uruguay,	  Informe	  de	  Opinión	  Pública,	  no.	  186-­‐7,	  February	  1972,	  Table	  20.	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The	  armed	  forces	  had	  previously	  been	  unprestigious	  and	  apolitical,	  but	  the	  crisis	  of	  the	  1960s	  coincided	  with	  exposure	  to	  national-­‐security	  doctrines	  taught	  by	  U.S.	  advisers	  and	  teachers	  at	  the	  Army	  School	  of	  the	  Americas	  in	  Panama.	  Those	  doctrines	  made	  a	  fetish	  out	  the	  need	  to	  contain	  Soviet	  expansionism	  in	  the	  Third	  World	  following	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution.37	  	  	  Consequently,	  the	  United	  States	  began	  to	  offer	  its	  assistance	  in	  the	  form	  of	  military	  aid	  to	  the	  Uruguayan	  government	  throughout	  the	  1960s	  and	  into	  the	  1970s	  throughout	  the	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship.	  Although	  the	  United	  States	  initially	  provided	  military	  aid	  in	  order	  to	  squash	  the	  Tupamaros,	  eventually	  it	  provided	  aid	  in	  order	  to	  suppress	  the	  left	  in	  general.	  For	  example,	  the	  Uruguayan	  government	  first	  declared	  a	  “state	  of	  siege”	  (government	  limitation	  on	  personal	  freedom)	  in	  1963	  following	  a	  workers	  strike	  at	  an	  electric	  company	  in	  Montevideo	  and	  thereafter	  in	  1965,	  1967,	  1968,	  and	  1969	  in	  response	  to	  various	  protests	  organized	  by	  laborers	  or	  insurgent	  activities	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  Tupamaros.	  Such	  governmental	  decrees	  intensified	  conflicts	  among	  laborers,	  guerrilla	  movements	  like	  the	  Tupamaros,	  and	  the	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  government.	  	  Moreover,	  following	  the	  1966	  elections,	  Uruguay	  re-­‐abandoned	  the	  colegiado	  and	  reinstated	  the	  presidential	  system,	  which	  reinforced	  executive	  power.	  Following	  the	  death	  of	  the	  newly	  elected	  Colorodo	  President	  and	  military	  General	  Óscar	  Diego	  Gestido	  Pose’s	  a	  year	  later,	  Gestido’s	  Vice	  President	  Jorge	  Pacheco	  Areco	  assumed	  the	  presidency	  and	  used	  his	  executive	  power	  to	  pursue	  and	  defeat	  the	  Tupamaros.	  In	  1971,	  he	  “decreed	  that	  the	  armed	  forces	  would	  intervene	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  the	  guerrilla	  movements,	  using	  his	  status	  as	  commander	  in	  chief	  to	  bypass	  Parliament”	  and	  create	  the	  Estado	  Mayor	  Conjunto	  (Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff,	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ESMACO)38	  Overall,	  increased	  military	  aid	  and	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  the	  presidential	  system	  in	  Uruguay	  promoted	  a	  technocratic,	  managerial	  form	  of	  executive	  administration	  that	  allowed	  Pacheco	  to	  pursue	  an	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  campaign	  to	  suppress	  the	  Tupamaros.	  	  	   As	  a	  result,	  between	  their	  official	  founding	  in	  1963	  and	  their	  demise	  in	  1972,	  the	  Tupamaros	  became	  increasingly	  violent	  in	  order	  to	  resist	  the	  breakdown	  of	  democracy	  in	  Uruguay	  and	  incite	  revolutionary	  change.	  As	  stated	  before,	  political-­‐economic	  decline	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  authoritarianism	  forced	  the	  Tupamaros	  to	  take	  extreme	  measures	  in	  order	  to	  overthrow	  the	  government.	  Therefore,	  when	  examining	  the	  movement’s	  revolutionary	  strategy,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  that,	  for	  the	  Tupamaros,	  tactics	  more	  often	  than	  not	  superseded	  ideological	  dictum,	  and	  that	  this	  transformation	  was	  necessary	  for	  what	  I	  argue	  contributed	  to	  the	  movement’s	  overall	  success	  through	  today.	  Although	  the	  Tupamaros	  maintained	  a	  relatively	  uniform	  organizational	  structure,	  their	  operations	  often	  deviated	  from	  one	  accepted	  ideology	  or	  even	  theory.	  Then,	  by	  the	  same	  token	  that	  we	  have	  examined	  how	  the	  conditions	  upon	  which	  the	  Tupamaros	  built	  their	  revolutionary	  theory	  changed,	  we	  must	  also	  explore	  how	  these	  changes	  manifested	  themselves	  in	  armed	  struggle.	  Examples	  of	  the	  Tupamaros’	  guerrilla	  operations	  throughout	  the	  1960s	  into	  the	  1970s	  abound.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  express	  how	  the	  guerrilla	  movement	  successfully	  adapted,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  provide	  a	  brief	  introduction	  of	  the	  Tupamaros’	  organizational	  structure	  and	  operations	  and	  examine	  a	  few,	  key	  operations	  within	  the	  Tupamaros’	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history.	  According	  to	  Professor	  Emeritus	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Nevada,	  Las	  Vegas	  in	  his	  book,	  Latin	  America	  in	  the	  Era	  of	  the	  Cuban	  Revolution,	  during	  their	  infancy,	  the	  Tupamaros	  remained	  underground	  in	  order	  to	  prepare	  and	  avoid	  confrontations	  with	  superior	  government	  forces.	  Gradually,	  they	  escalated	  their	  actions,	  “from	  break-­‐ins	  to	  bank	  robberies	  to	  bombings,	  but	  always	  eschewing	  fights	  with	  police	  and	  troops	  and	  avoiding	  any	  killings.”39	  For	  example,	  initially	  the	  Tupamaros	  were	  considered	  restrained	  revolutionaries,	  executing	  such	  operations	  as	  a	  Christmas	  Eve	  “Hunger	  Commando,”	  during	  which	  they	  hijacked	  a	  food	  truck	  and	  distributed	  its	  contents	  in	  the	  slums.	  In	  some	  instances,	  popular	  literature	  even	  referred	  to	  the	  Tupamaros	  as	  “Robin	  Hood”	  guerrillas.	  However,	  as	  membership	  comprehensively	  grew	  as	  a	  result	  of	  society’s	  increased	  dissatisfaction	  with	  Uruguay’s	  current	  political-­‐economic	  system,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  onset	  of	  authoritarian	  tendencies,	  the	  Tupamaros	  were	  able	  to	  establish	  an	  infrastructure	  in	  order	  to	  sustain	  the	  armed	  struggle,	  including	  “supply	  networks,	  safe	  houses,	  even	  underground	  clinics	  equipped	  for	  emergency	  surgery	  as	  well	  as	  long-­‐term	  recuperative	  care.”40	  Consequently,	  “the	  Tupamaros	  developed	  an	  elaborate	  organization	  designed	  to	  maximize	  fighting	  potential	  while	  insulating	  the	  movement	  against	  detection	  and	  destruction.41”	  They	  established	  a	  central	  executive	  committee	  and	  columns	  of	  30	  to	  50	  people,	  each	  of	  which	  contained	  between	  5	  and	  10	  members.	  Although	  most	  operations	  were	  coordinated	  from	  above,	  each	  column	  was	  organized	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  sustain	  itself	  in	  the	  incident	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of	  trouble	  at	  the	  top.	  In	  addition,	  columns	  were	  capable	  of	  gathering	  intelligence,	  maintaining	  supplies,	  and	  undertaking	  armed	  or	  propaganda	  action	  independently.	  This	  structure	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  one	  surviving	  column	  to	  reproduce	  the	  movement	  in	  the	  event	  that	  another	  column	  should	  collapse,	  for	  instance.42	  Following	  the	  government’s	  transition	  from	  the	  plural	  executive	  to	  a	  presidential,	  and	  consequently	  more	  authoritative,	  executive	  in	  1967,	  the	  Tupamaros	  were	  forced	  to	  change	  their	  revolutionary	  strategy.	  For	  example,	  according	  to	  economics	  and	  public	  policy	  analyst	  Cameron	  I.	  Crouch	  in	  his	  book,	  
Managing	  Terrorism	  and	  Insurgency:	  Regeneration,	  Recruitment	  and	  Attrition,	  on	  22	  December	  1966	  during	  a	  clash	  between	  police	  in	  a	  patrol	  and	  Tupamaros	  in	  a	  stolen	  vehicle,	  the	  police	  fatally	  shot	  Carlos	  Flores,	  whose	  death	  marked	  the	  first	  Tupamaro	  to	  be	  officially	  killed	  in	  action.	  Moreover,	  during	  the	  subsequent	  investigation	  the	  next	  day,	  the	  police	  discovered	  a	  number	  of	  hideouts,	  forced	  a	  number	  of	  Tupamaros	  underground,	  arrested	  and	  tortured	  others,	  and	  killed	  Mario	  Robaina,	  another	  Tupamaro,	  in	  a	  shootout.43	  While	  on	  one	  hand	  the	  Tupamaros	  suffered	  a	  major	  setback	  as	  a	  result	  of	  these	  events,	  on	  the	  other	  they	  motivated	  them	  to	  escalate	  their	  pressure	  by	  more	  aggressively	  and	  directly	  challenging	  government	  authority.	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“Operation	  Pando”	  	   During	  the	  late	  1960s,	  the	  Tupamaros	  began	  to	  engage	  in	  armed	  conflict	  with	  police	  and	  kidnap	  high	  profile	  figures	  for	  ransom,	  among	  other	  operations.	  	  Academics	  often	  consider	  Operación	  Pando	  (Operation	  Pando)	  the	  Tupamaros’	  official	  debut	  into	  the	  public	  eye.	  In	  her	  book,	  La	  Guerrilla	  Tupamara,	  former	  journalist,	  writer,	  biographer,	  lawyer,	  and	  ex-­‐Tupamara	  María	  Esther	  Gilio	  (1928	  –	  2011)	  recounts	  the	  Tupamaro	  occupation	  of	  Pando,	  a	  city	  of	  roughly	  60,000	  inhabitants	  located	  outside	  Montevideo	  in	  Canelones	  department.	  During	  the	  occupation,	  which	  took	  place	  on	  8	  October	  1969	  in	  commemoration	  of	  Che	  Guevara’s	  death	  two	  years	  earlier,	  the	  Tupamaros	  arrived,	  either	  individually	  or	  in	  small	  groups	  by	  private	  and	  public	  transportation,	  to	  the	  city	  of	  Pando.	  Disguised	  as	  a	  funeral	  procession,	  the	  Tupamaros	  infiltrated	  and	  occupied	  the	  city	  for	  several	  hours,	  severing	  its	  communications,	  attacking	  its	  police	  and	  fire	  departments,	  capturing	  its	  main	  buildings,	  and	  robbing	  a	  total	  of	  81,000	  pesos	  from	  its	  banks.	  	  Despite	  their	  apparent	  success,	  a	  band	  of	  1000	  troops	  intercepted	  one	  of	  the	  operation’s	  columns	  as	  it	  was	  fleeing	  the	  city	  and	  kills	  three	  of	  its	  members—Jorge	  Salerno,	  Ricardo	  Zabala,	  and	  Alfredo	  Cultelli—as	  well	  as	  captures	  and	  tortures	  16	  others.44	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  Tupamaros	  suffered	  a	  tragic,	  as	  a	  number	  of	  its	  core	  operatives	  were	  either	  killed	  or	  detained.	  On	  the	  other,	  the	  occupation’s	  audacity	  posed	  a	  sobering	  challenge	  to	  government	  authority.	  Moreover,	  Operation	  Pando	  reveals	  how,	  in	  many	  instances,	  women	  were	  just	  as	  involved	  in	  guerrilla	  operations	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as	  men	  were,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  Tupamaros	  valued	  women	  as	  an	  integral	  component	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  movement.	  	  	  The	  Dan	  Mitrione	  Case	  By	  mid-­‐1970,	  the	  Tupamaros	  and	  the	  government	  were	  testing	  the	  limit	  of	  each	  other’s	  insurgent	  and	  counterinsurgent	  activity.	  Perhaps	  the	  Tupamaros’	  most	  striking	  operation	  was	  the	  abduction	  of	  an	  instructor	  in	  USAID’s	  Office	  of	  Public	  Safety	  police	  counterinsurgency	  training	  program	  in	  Uruguay,	  Dan	  Mitrione,	  and	  Brazilian	  consul,	  Aloysio	  Dias	  Gomide,	  on	  31	  July.	  The	  Tupamaros	  successfully	  kidnapped	  the	  two	  men	  and	  detained	  them	  in	  the	  Cárcel	  del	  Pueblo	  (People’s	  Prison)	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  release	  of	  150	  political	  prisoners	  that	  had	  themselves	  been	  detained	  by	  the	  government.	  	  However,	  the	  Tupamaros’	  plan	  backfired;	  instead	  of	  releasing	  the	  prisoners,	  President	  Pacheco	  refused	  to	  negotiate,	  declared	  a	  state	  of	  siege,	  and	  later	  dispatched	  12,000	  police	  and	  troops	  to	  search	  Montevideo,	  sector	  by	  sector,	  for	  the	  People’s	  Prison.	  During	  the	  search,	  the	  police	  apprehended	  a	  number	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  Tupamaros,	  including	  Raúl	  Sendic,	  among	  others,	  and	  subsequently	  suspended	  all	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Tupamaros.	  Finally,	  in	  retaliation,	  the	  Tupamaros	  executed	  Mitrione	  on	  9	  August,	  accusing	  him	  of	  teaching	  torture	  methods	  to	  the	  armed	  forces.45	  	  Dan	  Mitrione’s	  assassination	  represents	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  operations	  of	  the	  Movimiento	  de	  Liberación	  Nacional-­‐Tupamaros’	  revolutionary	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strategy.	  First,	  the	  Tupamaros’	  decision	  to	  abduct	  and	  subsequently	  assassinate	  Dan	  Mitrione	  circumvented	  the	  revolutionary	  conditions	  as	  they	  existed	  in	  Uruguay	  and	  instead	  confronted	  them	  directly	  as	  they	  were	  imposed	  upon	  the	  country	  by	  imperial	  powers	  like	  the	  United	  States.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Mitrione’s	  abduction	  and	  assassination	  represent	  the	  tenuous	  relationship	  among	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Uruguayan	  government,	  and	  the	  Tupamaros	  (and	  the	  Uruguayan	  left	  in	  general)	  preceding	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship;	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and,	  subsequently,	  its	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  region,	  Dan	  Mitrione	  aided	  in	  exacerbating	  the	  revolutionary	  conditions	  that	  existed	  between	  both	  Uruguay’s	  ruling	  political	  class	  and	  its	  marginalized	  labor	  classes.	  The	  Tupamaros	  intentionally	  antagonized	  the	  United	  States	  and	  denounced	  its	  foreign	  policy	  by	  undermining	  the	  Uruguayan	  government’s	  authority	  and	  in	  turn	  publicizing	  the	  society’s	  desire	  for	  governmental	  change.	  Obviously,	  their	  actions	  were	  impressive,	  or	  at	  least	  audacious,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  MLN-­‐T,	  even	  if	  they	  cast	  doubt	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  guerrilla	  movement	  by	  precipitating	  harsh	  government	  repression.	  And	  the	  guerrilla	  movement	  did	  dissipate	  preceding	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship	  in	  1973.	  Despite	  a	  short	  period	  during	  which	  “the	  Tupamaros’	  fortunes	  fluctuated	  between	  spectacular	  successes	  and	  severe	  setbacks,”46	  the	  democratic	  election	  of	  socialist	  President	  Salvador	  Allende	  in	  Chile	  in	  September	  1970	  influenced	  the	  Tupamaros	  to	  briefly	  suspend	  armed	  conflict	  and	  call	  a	  truce	  with	  the	  Uruguayan	  government	  in	  order	  to	  support	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  (Broad	  Front,	  FA)	  coalition	  of	  leftist	  political	  parties	  in	  the	  1971	  general	  elections.	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Although	  the	  Tupamaros	  broke	  the	  truce	  and	  attempted	  to	  return	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  movement	  in	  December	  1971,	  following	  the	  FA’s	  loss	  to	  conservative	  Colorado	  Juan	  María	  Bordaberry	  Arocena	  in	  the	  general	  elections,	  by	  then	  the	  Uruguayan	  government’s	  counterinsurgency	  program,	  aided	  and	  advised	  by	  U.S.	  officials,	  had	  begun	  to	  tolerate	  and	  even	  sponsor	  such	  efforts	  as	  paramilitary	  death	  squads	  to	  repress	  and	  suppress	  leftist	  organization	  like	  the	  Tupamaros.	  In	  September	  1971,	  President	  Pacheco	  appointed	  the	  military	  in	  charge	  of	  all	  guerrilla	  activity,	  and,	  on	  15	  April	  1972,	  President	  Bordaberry	  declared	  a	  “state	  of	  internal	  war”	  that	  legitimized	  the	  government’s	  efforts	  to	  eliminate	  the	  Tupamaros.	  By	  mid-­‐1972,	  the	  Bordaberry	  government	  “had	  captured	  over	  600	  Tupamaros,	  killed	  100,	  and	  located	  70	  of	  their	  safe	  houses	  in	  the	  past	  three	  months.”47	  Counterinsurgents	  even	  recaptured	  Raúl	  Sendic,	  who	  had	  escaped	  prison	  the	  previous	  year.48	  Finally,	  President	  Bordaberry	  acceded	  to	  the	  gradual	  militarization	  of	  the	  government	  in	  June	  1973,	  “when	  he	  closed	  congress	  and	  municipal	  governments	  and	  began	  to	  rule	  by	  decree	  with	  a	  military-­‐civilian	  cabinet.”49	  The	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship	  pursued	  leftish	  groups	  like	  the	  Tupamaros	  both	  swiftly	  and	  decisively,	  detaining,	  torturing,	  disappearing,	  or	  forcing	  them	  into	  exile.	  	  Overall,	  the	  Tupamaros’	  decision	  to	  suspend	  the	  guerrilla	  operation	  and	  support	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  in	  the	  1971	  general	  elections,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  civic-­‐military	  dictatorship,	  thwarted	  their	  ability	  to	  continue	  along	  the	  same	  trajectory	  along	  the	  movement	  grew	  before	  the	  dictatorship.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  their	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decision	  to	  support	  the	  FA	  suggests	  that	  the	  Tupamaros	  anticipated	  the	  country’s	  impending	  democratic	  deterioration	  and	  were	  perhaps	  considering	  alternative	  methods	  to	  enact	  political	  change	  in	  Uruguay.
	  	   46	  
CONCLUSION:	  THE	  TUPAMAROS	  AND	  THE	  RISE	  OF	  THE	  FRETE	  AMPLIO:	  1973	  -­‐	  PRESENT	  	  	   Between	  the	  brief	  period	  of	  1963	  and	  1971,	  the	  Tupamaros	  had	  irreversibly	  contested	  the	  longevity	  of	  Uruguay’s	  ostensible	  tradition	  of	  two-­‐party	  rule.	  	  According	  to	  Luis	  E.	  González,	  their	  impact	  was	  profound	  in	  two	  ways.	  “First,	  although	  in	  retrospect	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  they	  never	  had	  any	  chance	  of	  success,	  they	  conveyed	  the	  image—as	  a	  minimum—that	  the	  police	  alone	  were	  no	  match	  for	  them.50”	  The	  Tupamaros	  challenged	  the	  state’s	  capacity	  and	  willingness	  to	  implement	  substantial	  government	  policy	  by	  overtly	  undermining	  its	  authority	  through	  the	  use	  of	  guerrilla	  tactics	  in	  order	  to	  instigate	  such	  change.	  However	  astoundingly	  swift	  and	  repressive	  the	  state’s	  efforts	  to	  repress	  such	  actions	  were,	  its	  obstinate	  refusal	  to	  implement	  policy	  change	  and	  instead	  rely	  on	  the	  state	  security	  apparatus	  to	  reestablish	  order	  within	  Uruguayan	  society	  anticipated	  its	  breakdown.	  	  	  	  “Second,	  the	  Tupamaros	  were	  the	  immediate,	  true	  revolutionary	  option;	  as	  such	  they	  were	  the	  left	  opposition	  to	  the	  legal	  left,	  which	  was	  thus	  caught	  between	  opposite	  forces	  upon	  which	  in	  the	  short	  run	  it	  had	  no	  influence	  at	  all.”51	  Therefore,	  the	  Tupamaros	  represented	  the	  only	  force	  impelling	  and	  compelling	  political	  change	  in	  Uruguay.	  As	  we	  have	  discussed,	  the	  legal	  left	  (the	  leftist	  groups	  that	  sought	  political	  change	  through	  elections)	  had,	  up	  to	  this	  point,	  proven	  incapable	  of	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  traditional	  parties’	  failures,	  at	  least	  insomuch	  that	  they	  had	  yet	  to	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organize	  a	  cohesive	  front	  through	  which	  to	  strengthen	  their	  electoral	  position	  against	  the	  established	  order.	  However,	  following	  the	  1967	  elections	  and,	  along	  with	  them,	  the	  onset	  of	  overt	  authoritarianism	  (imposed	  in	  large	  part	  to	  combat	  the	  Tupamaros),	  the	  legal	  left	  adopted	  a	  more	  unified	  position	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  an	  electoral	  foothold	  in	  Uruguayan	  elections.	  As	  such,	  this	  chapter	  will	  explain	  how	  the	  legal	  left	  finally	  organized	  itself	  into	  a	  comprehensive	  coalition	  of	  political	  parties—the	  Frente	  Amplio—in	  1971,	  and	  how,	  with	  the	  pivotal	  support	  of	  the	  Tupamaros,	  it	  used	  this	  front	  to	  popularly	  mobilize	  disaffected	  elements	  of	  the	  left,	  including	  members	  of	  the	  country’s	  traditional	  parties,	  and	  permanently	  dissolve	  Uruguay’s	  tradition	  of	  two-­‐party	  rule.	  In	  effect,	  the	  Tupamaros	  exposed	  longstanding	  inadequacies	  within	  the	  Uruguayan	  political	  structure,	  which,	  in	  its	  hard-­‐pressed	  attempt	  to	  preserve	  itself,	  anticipated	  its	  eventual	  breakdown.	  
	  Founding	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  In	  her	  book,	  Left	  in	  Transformation:	  Uruguayan	  Exiles	  and	  the	  Latin	  American	  
Human	  Rights	  Networks,	  1967-­‐1984,	  Uruguayan	  historian	  Vania	  Markarian	  discusses	  how	  the	  results	  of	  the	  1967	  elections	  instigated	  the	  electoral	  left	  to	  found	  the	  Frente	  
Amplio	  (Broad	  Front,	  FA)	  in	  January	  1971.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  in	  1959,	  the	  Colorados	  transferred	  power	  to	  the	  Blancos	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  nearly	  one	  hundred	  years	  following	  the	  election	  of	  President	  Martín	  Echegoyen.	  However,	  Blanco	  rule	  was	  short-­‐lived.	  Like	  the	  Colorados	  that	  had	  preceded	  them,	  the	  Blancos	  were	  unable	  to	  implement	  effective	  government	  policies	  to	  combat	  deepening	  economic	  stagnation.	  In	  addition,	  during	  that	  period	  the	  Tupamaro	  guerrilla	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movement	  emerged,	  and,	  by	  1967,	  had	  become	  a	  potent	  opposition	  force	  against	  the	  established	  order.	  As	  a	  result,	  1967	  marked	  the	  end	  of	  the	  brief	  period	  of	  Blanco	  rule	  following	  the	  election	  of	  President	  Óscar	  Diego	  Gestido	  Pose	  who,	  upon	  his	  death	  a	  year	  later,	  was	  replaced	  by	  his	  vice	  president,	  Jorge	  Pacheco	  Areco.	  President	  Pacheco’s	  inconsequential	  rise	  to	  power	  initiated	  a	  period	  of	  increasingly	  severe	  government	  repression	  imposed	  primarily	  to	  combat	  what	  the	  state	  had	  declared	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  national	  security—the	  Tupamaros.	  According	  to	  Markarian,	  “Starting	  in	  1968,	  the	  bare	  authoritarianism	  of	  the	  government	  and	  its	  harsh	  stabilization	  programs	  led	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  left	  to	  engage	  in	  yet	  another	  attempt	  to	  unify	  efforts	  and	  find	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  crisis.”52	  As	  the	  space	  for	  open	  opposition	  against	  Pacheco’s	  policies	  shrank,	  members	  of	  the	  legal	  left	  began	  to	  break	  with	  the	  traditional	  elite	  in	  order	  to	  devise	  an	  alternative	  course	  of	  action	  that	  would	  prevent	  the	  onset	  of	  authoritarian	  rule.	  	  By	  then,	  an	  umbrella	  labor	  organization,	  the	  Convención	  Nacional	  de	  
Trabajadores	  (National	  Convention	  of	  Workers,	  CNT),	  had	  already	  existed	  for	  more	  than	  a	  year,	  establishing	  (if	  it	  had	  not	  been	  already)	  the	  labor	  movement’s	  legitimacy	  against	  and	  disputes	  with	  the	  government	  and	  its	  policies.	  In	  addition,	  members	  who	  already	  belonged	  to	  left-­‐leaning	  factions,	  not	  only	  those	  within	  the	  Colorado	  and	  Blanco	  parties,	  but	  also	  within	  the	  armed	  forces,	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  disaffected	  with	  Pacheco’s	  austere	  government	  policies,	  further	  justifying	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  third	  party.	  For	  example,	  Colorado	  minister	  and	  Senator	  Zelmar	  Michelini,	  “appalled	  by	  the	  growth	  of	  governmental	  repression,”	  resigned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Vania	  Markarian,	  Left	  in	  Transformation:	  Uruguayan	  Exiles	  and	  the	  Latin	  American	  
Human	  Rights	  Network,	  1967-­‐1984	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2013),	  37.	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from	  office	  in	  October	  1967.53	  A	  year	  later,	  a	  group	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  military	  officers,	  including	  General	  Líber	  Seregni,	  commander	  of	  one	  of	  Uruguay’s	  most	  important	  military	  regions,	  defected	  from	  the	  armed	  forces	  for	  similar	  reasons.	  Michelini	  and	  Seregni	  were	  close	  friends	  and	  became	  prominent	  figures	  in	  the	  unified	  opposition	  against	  Pacheco.	  Their	  decisions	  to	  sever	  ties	  with	  the	  Colorados	  “showed	  that	  well	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  old	  left	  there	  was	  a	  remarkable	  uneasiness	  with	  the	  current	  political	  situation,	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  formerly	  consensual	  rules	  of	  politics”	  that	  influenced	  figures	  like	  Michelini	  and	  Seregni	  to	  renounce	  Pacheco’s	  government—and	  the	  traditional	  parties	  in	  general—and	  organize	  a	  broad	  opposition	  front.54	  Overall,	  the	  Pacheco	  government’s	  increasingly	  authoritarian	  tendencies	  made	  clear	  that	  there	  was	  no	  space	  for	  disagreement	  within	  the	  traditional	  parties,	  and	  thus	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  form	  an	  opposition	  front	  in	  order	  to	  challenge	  them.	  	  Although	  before	  1971	  the	  left	  had	  made	  two	  attempts	  to	  build	  a	  coalition	  of	  political	  parties—the	  Unión	  Popular	  (Popular	  Union,	  UP),	  formed	  by	  the	  Partido	  Socialista	  and	  small	  groups	  from	  the	  traditional	  parties,	  and	  the	  Frente	  Izquierda	  de	  
Liberación	  (Leftist	  Liberation	  Front,	  FIDEL),	  led	  by	  the	  Partido	  Comunista,	  neither	  had	  achieved	  electoral	  success.	  Moreover,	  attempts	  since	  then	  continued	  to	  flounder	  as	  a	  result	  of	  discrepancies	  among	  all	  sides	  of	  the	  left	  about	  which	  courses	  of	  political	  action	  to	  pursue.	  For	  instance,	  in	  June	  1968	  Uruguay’s	  Partido	  Demócrata	  
Cristiano	  (Christian	  Democrat	  Party,	  PDC)	  formally	  proposed	  the	  foundation	  of	  a	  broad	  opposition	  party	  following	  a	  gathering	  of	  left	  representatives	  at	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Ibid.,	  38.	  54	  Ibid.,	  39.	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Movimiento	  Nacional	  para	  la	  Defensa	  de	  Libertades	  Democráticas	  (National	  Movement	  for	  the	  Defense	  of	  Democratic	  Liberties,	  MNDLD)	  three	  months	  earlier,	  but	  withdrew	  from	  the	  coalition	  due	  to	  a	  disagreement	  over	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  invasion	  of	  Czechoslovakia.55	  	   Along	  with	  dissidents	  from	  the	  traditional	  parties,	  representatives	  from	  radical	  parties,	  workers,	  and	  others,	  the	  intellectual	  community	  aided	  in	  formulating	  a	  political	  alternative	  to	  two-­‐party	  rule	  that	  was	  beforehand	  stalled	  by	  ideological	  and	  practical	  stalemate.	  Newspapers	  like	  Marcha,	  founded	  in	  1939	  by	  Carlos	  Quijano	  as	  a	  “tribune	  for	  independent	  journalism,	  unregimented	  politics,	  and	  fresh	  cultural	  critique,”	  not	  only	  influenced	  “many	  independent	  activists	  and	  prominent	  intellectuals	  to	  join	  the	  legal	  left	  against	  the	  increasing	  authoritarianism	  of	  the	  government,”	  but	  also	  served	  as	  an	  intellectual	  forum	  for,	  among	  other	  things,	  the	  debate	  on	  founding	  this	  broad	  opposition	  front.56	  For	  example,	  while	  at	  first	  one	  of	  
Marcha’s	  columnists	  critiqued	  the	  PDCs	  proposal	  to	  form	  a	  unified	  front	  as	  too	  “idealistic,”	  in	  October	  1968	  the	  same	  columnist	  admitted	  that	  a	  “third	  party”	  might	  be	  the	  only	  solution	  to	  Uruguay’s	  dire	  political	  deterioration.57	  In	  1970,	  Marcha	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  The	  PDCs	  participation	  in	  building	  a	  coalition	  shows	  how	  widespread	  the	  left’s	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  traditional	  parties	  was	  during	  this	  period.	  In	  fact,	  the	  PDC,	  a	  center-­‐left	  fraction	  of	  the	  Colorados,	  was	  an	  important	  leader	  in	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  Frente	  Amplio,	  despite	  (and	  perhaps	  because	  of)	  its	  relatively	  moderate	  political	  leanings.	  	  See	  Marcha,	  26	  June	  1968,	  8-­‐9.	  56	  Markarian,	  39.	  57	  See	  Carlos	  M.	  Gutiérrez,	  “La	  illusion	  frentista,”	  Marcha,	  28	  June	  1968,	  8-­‐9,	  and	  “¿Hacia	  un	  tercer	  partido?,”	  Marcha,	  18	  October	  1968,	  11.	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became	  the	  main	  forum	  for	  this	  debate	  and,	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  even	  “offered	  its	  headquarters	  for	  a	  series	  of	  meetings	  to	  discuss	  these	  issues.”58	  	  Finally,	  in	  January	  1971,	  the	  PDC	  and	  the	  group	  led	  by	  Michelini	  made	  a	  bilateral	  agreement	  establishing	  the	  Frente	  Amplio,	  and,	  in	  February,	  “they	  signed	  the	  “constitutive	  declaration”	  of	  the	  new	  coalition,	  as	  did	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  legal	  left—including	  the	  PCU	  and	  its	  allies	  in	  FIDEL,	  the	  socialists,	  the	  recently	  legalized	  MRO,	  factions	  of	  the	  traditional	  parties,	  and	  some	  other	  minor	  groups.”59	  According	  to	  González,	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  was	  unlike	  any	  other	  coalition	  that	  had	  existed	  before	  it:	   The	  Frente	  Amplio	  unified	  the	  whole	  legal	  left:	  the	  socialistas	  and	  the	  Comunistas,	  the	  Partido	  Demócrata	  Cristiano,	  a	  fraction	  from	  the	  Colorados	  led	  by	  Zelmar	  Michelini	  and	  Hugo	  Batalla	  (the	  Lista	  99),	  and	  a	  rather	  heterogeneous	  group—which	  in	  1971	  used	  the	  sub-­‐lema	  Patria	  Grande	  (Great	  Fatherland)—including	  Blanco	  dissidents	  led	  by	  former	  Minister	  Enrique	  Erro	  and	  enjoying	  some	  support	  from	  the	  radical	  left.	  	  The	  Frente	  Amplio	  differed	  from	  the	  “large,	  fractionalized,	  pragmatic	  catch-­‐all	  parties	  that	  had	  always	  governed	  the	  country,”	  in	  that	  it	  was	  a	  coalition	  of	  “small,	  highly	  ideological	  and	  militant	  parties”	  that	  organized	  themselves	  in	  order	  to	  
challenge	  and	  undermine	  the	  tradition	  of	  two-­‐party	  rule	  rather	  than	  violently	  provoke	  the	  government.60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  The	  Unidad	  Popular’s	  (Popular	  Unity,	  UP)	  experience	  in	  Chile	  surely	  influenced	  this	  debate	  as	  well.	  In	  September	  1970,	  the	  UP	  coalition	  of	  political	  parties	  elected	  Marxist	  president	  Salvador	  Allende,	  representing	  the	  potential	  for	  an	  electoral	  alternative	  in	  other	  countries	  like	  Uruguay.	  See	  Markarian,	  40.	  59	  Ibid.,	  40-­‐41.	  60	  González,	  40.	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The	  Tupamaros	  and	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  The	  Tupamaros	  had	  by	  this	  point	  proven	  to	  be	  the	  most	  provocative	  of	  the	  forces	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  left.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  movement’s	  ostentatious	  guerrilla	  tactics	  exposed	  longstanding	  problems	  within	  Uruguayan	  society,	  making	  a	  mockery	  of	  the	  government’s	  incapacity	  to	  address	  both	  economic	  and	  social	  concerns	  and	  beckoning	  for	  revolutionary	  change.	  However,	  forging	  ahead	  proved	  difficult.	  As	  much	  as	  the	  government	  continued	  to	  fail	  in	  its	  efforts	  to	  enact	  effective	  policies	  (ostensible	  efforts,	  at	  that),	  it	  increased	  the	  state	  security	  apparatus	  in	  order	  to	  reestablish	  and	  maintain	  order	  within	  society.	  	  At	  first,	  these	  efforts	  were	  made	  primarily	  to	  combat	  the	  Tupamaros,	  whose	  use	  of	  violence	  escalated	  as	  the	  standard	  of	  living	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  Uruguayans	  declined.	  As	  former	  Tupamara	  Clara	  Aldrighi	  describes	  in	  her	  book,	  La	  izquierda	  
armada	  (The	  Armed	  Left),	  the	  Tupamaros	  transitioned	  from	  “armed	  propaganda”	  to	  “revolutionary	  justice”	  in	  order	  to	  decide	  the	  fate	  their	  targets	  and	  undermine	  the	  government’s	  growing	  efforts	  to	  eliminate	  them.61	  As	  the	  government	  proved	  obstinate	  to	  the	  Tupamaros’	  demands,	  it	  extended	  its	  use	  of	  security	  measures	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  Uruguayan	  society	  in	  order	  to	  decisively	  quell	  the	  movement.	  For	  example,	  President	  Pacheco	  declared	  a	  “state	  of	  siege”	  (suspension	  of	  civil	  liberties)	  for	  twenty	  days	  in	  August	  1970	  following	  the	  assassination	  of	  U.S.	  security	  official	  Dan	  Mitrione	  and	  for	  forty	  days	  in	  January	  1971	  following	  the	  kidnapping	  of	  British	  Ambassador	  Geoffrey	  Jackson	  in	  order	  to	  pursue,	  detain,	  and	  eventually	  imprison	  any	  and	  all	  Tupamaros.	  Failure	  seemed	  inevitable	  when,	  in	  September	  1971,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Clara	  Aldrighi,	  La	  izquiera	  armada:	  ideología,	  ética	  e	  identidad	  en	  el	  MLN-­‐
Tupamaros	  (Montevideo:	  Ediciones	  Trilce,	  2001),	  82-­‐3.	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Pacheco	  placed	  all	  counter-­‐insurgent	  operations	  under	  the	  army’s	  direct	  authority	  following	  the	  escape	  of	  over	  one	  hundred	  Tupamaros	  from	  prison.62	  While	  on	  one	  hand	  this	  decision	  all	  but	  doomed	  the	  Tupamaros	  to	  failure,	  on	  the	  other	  it	  forced	  them	  to	  consider	  an	  alternative—the	  Frente	  Amplio.	  Certainly	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  hotly	  debated	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Tupamaros’	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  1971	  elections.	  The	  elections	  forced	  the	  group	  “to	  define	  its	  position	  against	  two	  extremely	  confrontational	  understandings	  of	  politics”—the	  purportedly	  authoritarian	  regime	  and	  the	  Tupamaros.63	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  Frente	  was	  founded	  on	  its	  members’	  fundamental	  opposition	  against	  increased	  government	  repression.	  On	  the	  other,	  the	  Tupamaros	  had	  also	  become	  increasingly	  violent,	  apparent	  in	  their	  growing	  recourse	  to	  frequent	  abductions	  and	  assassinations	  of	  police	  and	  other	  high-­‐profile	  figures—most	  notably,	  Dan	  Mitrione.	  However,	  according	  to	  González,	  “The	  forces	  to	  their	  right	  appeared	  as	  maintaining	  a	  status	  quo	  the	  left	  was	  denouncing	  as	  deeply	  unjust;	  those	  forces	  were	  represented	  by	  parties	  whose	  organization	  and	  ways	  of	  doing	  politics	  were	  the	  polar	  opposite	  to	  those	  of	  the	  left.”64	  The	  Tupamaros	  were	  among	  these	  forces	  to	  the	  left.	  In	  fact,	  “The	  Comunistas	  in	  particular	  had	  repeatedly	  asserted	  that	  the	  only	  basic	  disagreement	  they	  had	  with	  the	  guerrillas	  was	  a	  procedural	  one.	  Some	  smaller	  groups	  were	  so	  radical	  in	  their	  language	  that	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  what	  disagreements,	  if	  any,	  they	  had	  with	  the	  Tupamaros.”65	  Therefore,	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  welcomed	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Tupamaros,	  especially	  as	  the	  government	  became	  overtly	  more	  authoritarian	  in	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Markarian,	  41-­‐2.	  	  63	  Ibid.,	  42.	  64	  González,	  40.	  	  65	  Ibid.,	  40.	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practices	  against	  the	  guerrilla	  movement,	  and	  even	  if	  the	  guerrillas	  did	  not	  fully	  endorse	  its	  participation	  in	  electoral	  politics.	  After	  all,	  the	  Tupamaros	  could	  not	  ignore	  and	  understood	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  1971	  elections	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  further	  mobilize	  the	  left	  against	  the	  traditional	  elite.	  “Thus,	  they	  ended	  up	  applauding	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  FA	  as	  a	  step	  forward	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  true	  popular	  mobilization,	  but	  regretting	  its	  penchant	  for	  elections	  and	  legal	  politics.”66	  	  In	  1971	  the	  Tupamaros	  formed	  the	  Movimiento	  26	  de	  Marzo	  (March	  26	  Movement,	  26M),	  which	  formally	  declared	  its	  support	  for	  the	  Frente	  Amplio.	  In	  October	  of	  the	  same	  year,	  a	  month	  before	  the	  elections,	  the	  Tupamaros	  also	  established	  a	  unilateral	  truce	  with	  the	  government	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  alleviate	  tension	  and	  bolster	  the	  Frente’s	  electoral	  position	  against	  the	  traditional	  parties.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  1971	  elections	  represented	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  left	  was	  able	  to	  cohesively	  organize	  an	  electoral	  front	  within	  Uruguay’s	  institutional	  setting.	  The	  Frente	  campaigned	  in	  support	  of	  the	  general	  public,	  maintaining	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  government	  (Pacheco’s	  in	  particular)	  ignored	  economic	  problems	  by	  implementing	  policies	  designed	  to	  defend	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  used	  the	  state	  apparatus	  to	  repress	  the	  social	  upheaval	  that	  resulted	  from	  it.	  Overall,	  “the	  FA	  regarded	  the	  radicalization	  of	  the	  youth,	  both	  in	  student	  demonstrations	  and	  guerrilla	  organizations,	  as	  an	  understandable,	  if	  regrettable,	  reaction	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  economic	  opportunities,	  the	  inactivity	  of	  the	  political	  system,	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  direct	  repression.”67	  In	  addition,	  the	  Frente	  argued,	  “a	  truly	  democratic	  government	  with	  a	  strong	  social	  agenda	  would	  end	  guerrilla	  activities,	  allowing	  the	  Armed	  Forces	  to	  return	  to	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  Markarian,	  43.	  67	  See	  Speech	  by	  Seregni	  on	  26	  March	  1971,	  in	  Líber	  Seregni,	  Discursos.	  Ibid.,	  43.	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barracks”	  and	  permitting	  the	  government	  to	  tackle	  the	  country’s	  outdated	  political-­‐	  economic	  structure.68	  However,	  throughout	  the	  campaign,	  the	  Frente	  only	  vaguely	  cited	  the	  importance	  of	  agrarian	  reform,	  a	  longstanding	  issue	  in	  Uruguay	  as	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  Latin	  America.	  Either	  way,	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  presented	  a	  substantial	  argument	  against	  the	  traditional	  parties	  and	  the	  institutional	  setting	  that	  supported	  them	  as	  they	  had	  until	  that	  point	  developed,	  and	  the	  Tupamaros,	  beyond	  expressing	  their	  support	  for	  the	  party	  through	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  26M,	  humbled	  themselves	  in	  order	  to	  further	  strengthen	  the	  Frente’s	  electoral	  position.	  Amid	  rumors	  of	  a	  military	  coup,	  for	  example,	  the	  Tupamaros	  participated	  with	  former	  members	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  other	  members	  of	  the	  security	  apparatus	  in	  “Plan	  Contragolpe,”	  a	  movement	  intended	  to	  prevent	  the	  onset	  of	  authoritarian	  dictatorship.69	  However,	  despite	  such	  efforts,	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  failed	  to	  gain	  the	  support	  needed	  to	  topple	  the	  traditional	  parties.	  According	  to	  Markarian,	  “However	  credible	  its	  written	  program	  and	  general	  principles	  might	  have	  been	  for	  a	  large	  sector	  of	  the	  citizenry,	  the	  support	  of	  the	  MLN-­‐T	  positioned	  the	  FA	  as	  an	  extremist	  option.”70	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  was	  especially	  difficult	  for	  the	  Frente	  to	  win	  the	  support	  of	  voters	  on	  the	  countryside,	  and	  even	  that	  of	  voters	  outside	  Montevideo.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  elections	  were	  surprising.	  First,	  although	  he	  received	  the	  most	  votes,	  the	  constitution	  prevented	  President	  Pacheco	  from	  serving	  a	  second	  term,	  and	  the	  electoral	  effort	  to	  amend	  that	  law	  was	  disapproved.	  As	  a	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  69	  Aldrighi,	  103-­‐104.	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result,	  Pacheco’s	  handpicked	  successor,	  Juan	  María	  Bordaberry	  Arocena,	  won	  the	  presidency.	  Second,	  although	  it	  only	  won	  18	  percent	  of	  the	  vote,	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  won	  30	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  Montevideo.	  In	  other	  words,	  nearly	  a	  fifth	  of	  the	  total	  population,	  and	  a	  third	  of	  the	  population	  of	  Montevideo,	  was	  disaffected	  with	  the	  current	  political	  system.	  Although	  the	  other	  four-­‐fifths	  of	  the	  population	  voted	  for	  the	  traditional	  parties,	  this	  figure	  represents	  the	  first	  time	  in	  Uruguay’s	  electoral	  history	  that	  a	  non-­‐traditional	  party	  garnered	  considerable	  support	  from	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  population,	  suggesting	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  city,	  the	  Tupamaros’	  armed	  propaganda	  campaign	  had	  been	  successful	  in	  influencing	  all	  sides	  of	  the	  left	  to	  challenge	  the	  established	  order	  (even	  if	  it	  were	  through	  the	  polls).71	  	  More	  importantly,	  the	  1971	  elections	  marked	  the	  decisive	  end	  to	  Uruguay’s	  ostensible	  tradition	  of	  two-­‐party	  rule.	  Whereas	  for	  some	  time	  the	  measures	  initiated	  by	  Batllismo	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  to	  support	  the	  principle	  of	  coparticipación—including	  the	  Ley	  de	  Lemas	  (double	  simultaneous	  voting,	  DSV),	  for	  instance—held	  the	  traditional	  parties	  together,	  they	  also,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  permitted	  members	  within	  them	  to	  form	  and	  join	  factions	  that	  encouraged	  individual	  promotion	  rather	  than	  the	  party’s	  promotion	  as	  a	  whole.	  For	  example,	  while	  on	  one	  hand	  members	  of	  the	  Colorados	  competed	  under	  the	  same	  lema,	  its	  factional	  members	  competed	  among	  one	  another	  within	  different	  sub-­‐lemas.	  Although	  the	  number	  of	  votes	  for	  each	  candidate	  within	  a	  sub-­‐lema	  contributed	  to	  the	  overall	  number	  of	  votes	  for	  the	  party	  as	  a	  whole,	  it	  was	  quite	  possible	  to	  win	  a	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government	  seat	  even	  if	  the	  party	  had	  a	  poor	  showing	  in	  an	  election.	  In	  addition,	  the	  constitutional	  reform	  to	  return	  to	  the	  presidential	  system	  in	  1967,	  during	  a	  period	  of	  profound	  economic	  stagnation	  and	  potent	  guerrilla	  activity,	  expanded	  executive	  powers	  and	  further	  mitigated	  factional	  members’	  devotion	  to	  the	  party.	  After	  all,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  achieve	  political	  power	  through	  enough	  self-­‐promotion.	  Therefore,	  by	  1971,	  many	  members	  of	  the	  legal	  left	  renounced	  their	  allegiance	  to	  the	  traditional	  elite	  and	  joined	  the	  Frente	  Amplio.	  In	  effect,	  while	  on	  one	  hand	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Frente	  Amplio	  helped	  consolidate	  the	  now	  overtly	  authoritarian	  Colorado	  party	  by	  recruiting	  its	  disaffected	  members	  and	  thus	  strengthening	  its	  position	  against	  the	  left,	  by	  the	  same	  token	  its	  foundation	  substantiated	  a	  legitimate	  left-­‐wing	  force	  that	  would	  continue	  to	  transform	  as	  it	  challenged	  the	  right	  and	  reemerged	  following	  the	  dictatorship	  to	  compete	  once	  again	  in	  electoral	  politics.
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